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ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is a reflection of the evolution of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE/BEE) and 
an evaluation of the current state of the programme. BEE is one of the most topical subjects in current South 
African (SA) economic discourse. Born of a need to remedy the ravages of Apartheid, BEE has evolved, and 
indeed continues to evolve, into one of the most elaborate and ambitious empowerment endeavours the world 
over. BEE aims to integrate a broad base of previously disadvantaged persons into the mainstream economy and 
to redistribute control over the country’s economic resources. An elaborate and comprehensive regulatory 
framework has been crafted to bring these aims to fruition. This paper provides an overview of this framework, 
and through a methodical analysis of the governing instruments, the function and legal status of each 
instruments is clarified and the interrelationship between them is illustrated. It is argued that while this 
governing structure has aided BEE progress, advancement has been marginal. This can be attributed to the 
various hurdles that stand to hinder the initiative. This paper further highlights challenges that are both intrinsic 
and extrinsic to the regulatory framework, with a particular focus on problems of : financing; the broadness of 
broad-based BEE; fraud and; constraints of attitude. This author concludes that BEE, as a work in progress, is a 
programme that holds great prospects, if only the surmountable hurdles are overcome.    
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE/BBBEE) is an initiative geared towards 
spreading economic benefits to a broad base of previously disadvantaged persons. The 
objective of this paper is two fold - first, it intends to critically analyse the regulatory 
framework of BEE, and secondly it will assess the challenges facing the drive.  
 
The point of departure will be to outline the historical context giving rise to the need 
for BEE. This will be followed by a comparative assessment of the economic empowerment 
programmes undertaken in Malaysia and the United States (US). The value of such 
comparison is not only to illuminate the general nature of such empowerment enterprises, but 
also to draw lessons for South Africa (SA) from these experiences. The paper will then turn 
to a general discussion of the regulatory framework, with a particular focus on the key 
regulatory instrument - the Codes of Good Practice (the Codes). The second half of the paper 
will deal with those challenges that manifest within the regulatory framework, and then 
proceed to consider particularly stark challenges that stand to impede BEE in general. This 
paper concludes that BEE, as a work in progress, has made marginal strides and has the 
potential to ensure that a broad base of intended beneficiaries are empowered. However, 
should the challenges outlined in this paper not be surmounted, this goal may be elusive.   
 
1.1.1  Black Economic Empowerment : A Definition 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is an integrated socio-economic undertaking 
aimed at remedying the inequalities characteristic of Apartheid.1 The programme aims to 
transform the South African (SA) economic landscape by ensuring participation of the 
majority of the population in the economy through the transfer of equity, and the 
                                                 
1BEE Commission ‘A National Integrated Black Economic Empowerment Strategy’ BEE Commission Report 
2001 at 2 and also see http://www.yokogawa.com/za/cp/overview/za-bee.htm  (Accessed on 30/07/2005). 
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redistribution of control over the country’s economic resources.2 The need for such an 
undertaking is born out of a constitutional imperative to rectify the gross economic 
disempowerment of the non-White majority during Apartheid that has resulted in a current 
mainstream economy that excludes the majority of citizens.3 As a point of departure, this 
paper will now briefly highlight the economic disempowerment mechanisms employed by 
the Apartheid Nationalist government.  
 
1.1.2 Apartheid and Disempowerment 
Apartheid4 was a system of government predicated on policies of ‘racial distinction’,5 
‘ethnic differentiation’,6 and segregation.7 The professed rationale8 behind Apartheid was 
that unified citizenship and integration of SA society was not feasible.9 Under the guise of 
promoting ‘the right to self-determination’,10 the notion of separate development was 
considered not only desirable but necessary.11 Each ethnic group was designated to its own 
                                                 
2
 BEE Commission (n 1) 2.  
3
 Osode ‘ The New Broad-Based Economic Empowerment Act: A Critical Evaluation’ (2004) vol 18 No 1 
Speculum Juris 108.  
4The lexical meaning of Apartheid is ‘apart-ness’… ‘separateness’ or ‘separation’”. (Nortje ‘The Origins of 
Apartheid’ in La Guma Apartheid Collection of Writing on South African Racism By South Africans 19.)  
The term denotes ‘physically repressive, economically exploitative and ideologically racist or ethnicist 
segregation’. (Bathish et al ‘Apartheid: Ancient, Past and Present’ The TRC: Commissioning the Past, 
Conference held 11-14 June 1999 University of the Witswatersrand  unnumbered).   
The scope of the historical contextualisation of this paper is restricted to the Nationalist Government’s 
Apartheid regime. It should be noted as an aside, that in order to fully understand the evolution of political 
Apartheid, attention must be given to those policies that the English element initiated in order to remain 
politically dominant over the Africans and the Coloureds. Those policies were afterwards adopted by 
Afrikaners, and they can be classified as follows: 
‘a) ‘Equal’ Political rights irrespective of colour or race but subject to such constitutional safeguards which left 
political dominance in the ends of the English Minority; b) Total exclusion of coloureds from the franchise; 
c)Territorial separation of the English districts of the Cape Colony; d) Federation of certain territories in order 
to get new federal safeguards and local self-government for the English element; e) Separate representation for 
Africans in the Upper or Lower House of Parliament (The Natal Policy (1874-1893);  f) Total social, economic 
and political segregation of Africans and g) Ethnic Differentiation’. (Haasbroek Apartheid: A Constitutional 
Analysis: Ethnic diversity and the struggle for Political Supremacy 36-37).  
5
 Nortje ‘The Origins of Apartheid’ in La Guma Apartheid Collection of Writing on South African Racism By 
South Africans 19.)  
6
 Haasbroek  Apartheid: A Constitutional Analysis: Ethnic diversity and the struggle for Political Supremacy 5. 
7
 Haasbroek (n 6) 37. 
This segregation pervaded all spheres of life, including cultural, economic, social, political,…and territorial 
spheres.  
(Rhoodie et al Apartheid: Socio-historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of The Apartheid Idea  
25.) 
8
 Nortje (n 5) 21.  
9
 Nortje (n 5 ) 21. Also see International Labour Office Apartheid and Labour: A critical review of the effects of 
Apartheid on Labour Matters in South Africa 13. 
10
 Nortje (n 5 ) 21. 
11
 Nortje (n 5) 21. 
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geographical location with the objective of establishing a self-sufficient area.12 This 
separation was purported to be a method of preventing racial clashes and friction.13  
 
The actual rationale for the segregationist regime was the survival of the White 
Afrikaner minority in SA.14 To this end, the Nationalist Party (NP) leaders pursued policies 
that systematically disempowered Blacks, Coloureds and Asians.15 This paper will now turn 
to outline the nature of and effect of these mechanisms at an economic level. 
 
1.1. 2.1  A History of Segregation: Economic Disempowerment of A Majority  
‘The dilemma at the heart of the NP policy [was] that what they most need[ed was] at 
the same time what they most fear[ed]. They need[ed] Black labour to create White 
prosperity; but fear[ed] the integration of White and Black in a common society’.16As a 
solution to this conundrum, the NP channelled its efforts towards eradicating permanent 
Black settlements17 within White areas and encouraged instead migratory labour.18 As a 
consequence of this policy, the homelands19 were established and the pass laws20 were 
                                                 
12
 Haasbroek (n 6 ) 5. 
13
 This was one of the reasons proffered by Prime Minister Strijdom of the Nationalist Party. Nortje (n 5) 22. 
14
 Haasbroek (n 6 ) 37. This goal of ensuring white supremacy and survival is starkly apparent in the following 
statement by Mr Minister Strijdom (soon to become Prime Minister): ‘Our Policy is that the Europeans must 
stand their ground and must remain baas (boss) in South Africa…if the non-Europeans are developed on the 
same basis as the Europeans, how can the Europeans remain baas…Our view is that in every sphere the 
Europeans must retain the right to rule the country and to keep it a White man’s country’. (Nortje (n 5 ) 22-24). 
15
 Nortje (n 5 ) 21. 
16
 Nortje (n 5 ) 24. 
17
 Business International S.A. ‘Apartheid and Business: An analysis of the rapidly evolving challenge facing 
companies with investments in South Africa’ (1980) Business International  86. 
18
 Nortje (n 5 ) 25. This migratory labour regime, would ensure only temporary integration of Africans into the 
‘White economic structure’. (Rhoodie et al Apartheid: Socio-historical Exposition of the Origin and 
Development of the Apartheid Iidea  26).  
19
 Whyte ‘Apartheid and Other Policies’ (undated) no. 17 New South Africa Pamphlet  8. The home lands (also 
called the Reserves) were areas designated specifically for African settlement. These Reserves were 
impoverished areas largely because of ‘overcrowding, overstocking and soil erosion’, and remained under 
developed with subsistence farming as the predominant occupation. (Higgs ‘“The Bantusans”: South Africa’s 
“Bantu Homelands” Policy’ in La Guma Apartheid : A Collection of Writings on South African Racism by 
South Africans 79-90.) 
20
 The pass laws were a form of ‘restriction of movement and influx control’. (Higgs ‘“The Bantusans”: South 
Africa’s “Bantu Homelands” Policy’ in La Guma Apartheid : A Collection of Writings on South African Racism 
by South Africans 88. ) 
The pass laws were important in the regulation of  ‘supply of native labour in the interests of the European’. 
(Roskam Apartheid and Discrimination: Some Remarks with regard to the relationships between the white and 
respective non-white groups in the Union of South Africa 68.)  
These laws required that all Blacks over the age of 16 years of age hold a reference (“pass”) book. (International 
Labour Office, Apartheid and Labour: A critical review of the effects of Apartheid on Labour Matters in South 
Africa  14.) Any African not in possession of one of these pass books could not be employed. Furthermore, ‘any 
authorised officer may at any time call upon a native to produce his reference book, and failure to produce the 
reference book on demand of such an officer [was] punishable with a fine of up to £10 or imprisonment for up 
  
13 
introduced.21 The pass laws together with a compendium of legislation22 had the 
detrimental effect of reducing the scope of employment options available to Blacks 23 and 
diminishing the bargaining power of these workers.24 This was compounded by the 
temporary nature of employment, which served to preclude prospects of promotion and 
proficiency in a particular job.25 Generally, the jobs available to Africans in the White areas 
were poorly paid26 and required no skills.27 Together with the statutory implementation28 of 
job reservations29 and the institutionalisation of ‘customary exclusions’,30 the plight of non-
Whites was entrenched.  
 
In light of this historical context the BEE programme was initiated. An enterprise of 
this type is not peculiar to SA however, as is evident from the Malaysian and the US 
empowerment programmes. These foreign experiences will now be discussed for their 
comparative value.     
 
                                                                                                                                                       
to one month’. (International Labour Office, Apartheid in Labour Matters: I.L.O Policy Statements and Reports 
concerning “Apartheid” in Labour Matters in the Republic of South Africa,1964- 1966  20-21). 
21
 Nortje (n 5 ) 25. 
22
 The legislation enacted to effect influx control included inter alia, the Black (Urban Areas) Acts, The Black 
Labour Act and its regulations, the Black Law Amendment Act and the Black Affairs Administration Act. 
(International Labour Office, Apartheid and Labour: A  critical review of the effects of Apartheid on Labour 
Matters in South Africa 13-14.) 
23
 This was so because the passes restricted free movement. (Bathish et al ‘Apartheid: Ancient, Past and 
Present’ 1999 The TRC: Commissioning the Past, Conference held 11-14 June 1999 University of the 
Witswatersrand  unnumbered). 
24
 Kotz, D Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis 267.  
25
 International Labour Office, Apartheid and Labour: A critical review of the effects of Apartheid on Labour 
Matters in South Africa 17. 
26
 Bathish et al  ‘Apartheid: Ancient, Past and Present’ 1999 The TRC: Commissioning the Past, Conference 
held 11-14 June 1999 University of the Witswatersrand  unnumbered). 
27
 Higgs ‘“The Bantusans”: South Africa’s “Bantu Homelands” Policy’ in La Guma Apartheid : A Collection of 
Writings on South African Racism by South Africans 89).  
28
 ‘Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act gave the Minister of Manpower Utilisation the power to issue a 
decree reserving any particular job to any particular race,…[furthermore] specific laws such as the Mines and 
Works Act, which [prohibited] blacks from performing mining jobs that require blasting certificates, and the 
Black Building Worker’s Act, which…denied them the right to do skilled building work outside black areas’. 
(Business International S.A (n 17) 87).  
For a more detailed exposition on job reservation in the building industry, see generally Crankshaw ‘Apartheid 
and Economic Growth: Craft Unions, Capital and the State in the South African Building Industry 1945-1975’ 
(1990) vol 16 No. 3 Journal of Southern African Studies 503 at 523-526.  
29International Labour Office, Apartheid in Labour Matters: I.L.O Policy Statements and Reports concerning 
“Apartheid” in Labour Matters in the Republic of South Africa,1964- 1966  6.  
Job reservations were measures that reserved jobs for Whites, thus protecting White workers from possible 
competition from other races. They prohibited Blacks from doing these reserved jobs,…and ‘seriously restricted 
the range of jobs open to Blacks, [as well as limiting their] scope for advancement within a particular industry’.  
(International Labour Office (n 25) 18). 
30
 Customary exclusions resulted from company managerial attitudes. For example, a Black law graduate would 
not be employed as an articled clerk ‘because it would be awkward if the [White] typist had to take dictation 
from him’. (Business International S.A (n 17) 88).  
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2. A COMPARARTIVE ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
 
 
The Malaysian and US programmes are particularly interesting as, empowerment in 
Malaysia, like in SA, strives to uplift a majority and so provides a useful yardstick for 
comparison, whereas the US initiative looks to empower a minority.31 Several similarities 
and lessons can be teased out from these experiences and these will be alluded to throughout 
the paper.    
 
2.1 EMPOWERMENT IN MALAYSIA  
2.1.1 A History of Preference: Economic Passivity of a Majority   
  The Malays and other indigenous people comprise ‘the Bumiputeras or sons of the 
soil’, and represent 61% of the Malaysian population.32 The rest of the population comprises 
24% Chinese and 7% Indian.33 Preferential treatment of the Malays has always been 
apparent, where from colonial times the Malays had less difficulty owning land, were 
educated for free and were afforded job preferences in the colonial administration.34 
Notwithstanding the preferences, the Bumiputera’s have always played a limited role in the 
country’s economic development.35 This situation has its roots in the British colonial regime 
in terms of which the Chinese and Indians provided most of the labour, particularly in the 
lucrative and major rubber plantation and mining industries.36   This exposure as well as the 
economic ingenuity of the Chinese saw their eventual rise from the status of labourers to that 
of business entrepreneurs,37 which resulted in Chinese domination in skilled employment, 
                                                 
31
 It should be noted that the minority groups in the United States extend beyond Blacks/African Americans and 
include for example Hispanics and women ( Sowell (33) 34). The scope of this paper will be limited to a 
discussion of empowerment of Blacks. 
32
 These are statistics as documented in 2004. (Sowell, T Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical 
Study 56.) 
33
 Sowell, T Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 55. 
34
 Sowell (n 33) 58.  
35
 Sowell (n 33) 56.  
36
 Sowell (n 33) 56. 
37
 Sowell ( n 33) 57. 
  
15 
leaving the Malays in the impoverished recesses of unskilled work.38 There was thus a dire 
need to remedy these economic imbalances and as a result the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
was launched in 1970.39 To circumvent any possible resistance to this policy, a multitude of 
government strategies were instituted to limit free speech primarily by prohibiting public 
questioning of governmental policies.40 
 
2.1.2 The New Economic Policy (NEP) 1970-1990 
The NEP had two main objectives - firstly to reduce the 49% proportion of Malaysian 
population living below the poverty line to 16% by 1990, and secondly to remedy economic 
inequality.41 These goals were to be achieved by a redistribution of income to the Bumiputera 
in particular (who were the poorest of the population)42 and generally improving the 
economic status of this group.43 A number of strategies were pursued on many levels to bring 
these goals to fruition, for example increased state intervention saw several government 
institutions formed to advance Malay-owned businesses.44 Furthermore, government loans 
were issued to extend preferential credit to the indigenous people,45 with these groups also 
enjoying employment preferences as well as the chance to acquire equity at below par 
value.46 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Manning ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia between 1970 and 1990: how successful was it, and what are the 
lessons for South Africa?’ (1993)  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Issues in Development, No. 1 4. 
39
 Sowell (n 33) 60. See also Manning (n 38) 4. What distinguishes the Malaysian Empowerment experience is 
that unlike the empowerment programmes in South Africa and the United States, it was not born ourtof 
historical racial marginalization. Instead the NEP, under the guise of pursuing racial equalization, was really an 
attempt to rectify ‘embarrassing ethnic imbalances’ in the economy. (Sowell (n 33) 63).  
40
 Galenson Labour and Economic Growth in Five Asian Countries: South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and the Phillipines 18. See also Sowell (n 33) 60.  
41
 Manning (n 38) 4. The economic imbalances related to ‘imbalances in income, in employment, and in 
ownership and control of wealth’. (Snodgrass Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia 66 and 59-
60).  
42
 Manning (n 38) 4.  
43
 This would be done primarily by ‘increasing the numbers of Bumiputera in professional occupations’ and 
improving the 2% Malay corporate equity holdings by 1990. (Manning (n 38) 5).  
44
 Jomo Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy 155. Such institutions included the 
Bumiputera Assistance Unit in the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) and the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation. 
45
 Sowell (n 33) 62. 
46
 Sowell (n 33) 61. 
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2.1.3 Evaluation of the Preference Policy 
The Malaysian empowerment programme is one of the most successful in the 
world.47 This is evidenced by the relative progress of the targeted group.48 As regards the 
success of the NEP’s first objective (poverty reduction), the level of poverty among the 
Bumiputera had been reduced from 64.8% in 1970 to 23.8% by 1987.49 With regard to the 
second objective of restructuring the economic society and employment, success is apparent 
in that 21% (of the targeted 30%) of corporate stock had been transferred to the Malays by 
1995,50 which served to nurture the creation of a Bumiputera middleclass.51 The shortcoming 
however, was that the majority of the intended beneficiary groups were confined to low 
skilled, low paying jobs.52  
 
These successes, laudable as they are, were not achieved without a price. The stifling 
of free speech as a result of oppressive laws and the shortage of technically trained labour 
resulting from the systematic exclusion of the groups historically seen to have excelled,53 are 
but a few of the negative consequences. Nevertheless viewed holistically, the NEP was 
successful, and its effectiveness was largely attributable to the economic growth prevalent in 
Malaysia during the time of its implementation. It is evident that economic growth is a key 
ingredient in ensuring the success of BEE.54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47Emsley The Malaysian Experience Of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa 7. See also Sowell (n 35) 
75. 
48
 Sowell (n 33) 75. 
49
 Manning (n 38) 24. 
50
 Sowell (n 33) 61. The problem, however, was that such transfers were biased in favour of the elites. 
51
 Manning (n 38) 24.  
52
 Manning (n 38) 24. 
53
 Sowell (n 33) 75. 
54
 Emsley ( n 47) 7. Important aspects that facilitate such growth are economic stability, and poverty alleviation 
through government intervention. (Emsley (n 47) 8-9.) 
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2.2 EMPOWERMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF  
     AMERICA 
 
2.2.1 A History of Segregation: Economic Disempowerment of a Minority  
In the US, Blacks make up a mere 12% of the population.55 Similar to the SA 
situation, the need to pursue an economic empowerment strategy was born out of a history of 
segregation.56 Blacks were largely excluded from the mainstream economy57 as a result of 
‘job discrimination’.58 They were also denied financial credit, prejudiced in the ownership of 
businesses and marginalised in the procurement of government contracts.59  
 
2.2.2 Economic Empowerment  
 Although the government provides loans and grants,60 the primary empowerment 
mechanism employed, at both federal and state level, has been preferential procurement 
policies structured in favour of minority groupings.61 Such preferences manifest as ‘set 
asides’,62 ‘bid price preferences’63 and ‘goals programmes’,64 and advancement through these 
                                                 
55
 Sowell (n 33) 116. The scope of this paper will be limited to the empowerment of African Americans/Blacks. 
It should be noted however that ‘affirmative action programs have expanded over the years to include not only 
other racial or ethnic groups, but also women, so that such policies now apply to a [fair proportion] of the 
American population’. (Sowell (n 33)116.) 
56
 Encarta Encyclopaedia ‘The United States of America’, Microsoft ® Encarta ® Online Encyclopaedia 2005 
http://Encarta.msn.com © 1997-2005 Microsoft Corporation. (Accessed on 30/07/2005).  
57
 Weaver ‘The Impact of Ethnicity upon Urban America’ in Liebman (ed) Ethnic Relations in America 72. 
58
  Weaver (n 57) 71. 
59
 Lewis ‘Women’s History: Affirmative Action Review’ Part 9 (2003): 
http://womenhistory.about.com/library/etext/gov/bl_gov_aa_09.htm. (Accessed on 06/09/2005). The general 
problems hindering minorities were reiterated in the decision of Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) ‘The 
Chief Justice summarised the congressional findings regarding the difficulties confronting minority businesses 
as “deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an inadequate 
track record, lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, pre-selection 
before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to 
disfavour minority businesses”’ at 467.  
60
 Sharp ‘Minority-owned businesses’ available at http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Man-
Mix/Minority-Owned-Businesses.html (Accessed on 20/06/2006). 
61
 Lewis (n 59).  
62
 Also termed ‘sheltered markets’ are where ‘only targeted groups can compete for government contracts’. 
(Sweet ‘Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical 
Investigation’ (2006) Vol 33 No. 1 Journal of Law and Society 162).  
63
 In terms of Bid Price Preferences, SDB’s are afforded a 10% bid preference. (Lewis (n 59). 
64
 With ‘goal programmes’ the government attempts to contract with minority-owned businesses without using 
set-asides or bid enhancements-most often requiring prime contractors to make good faith efforts in 
subcontracting with [minority owned businesses]’. (Sweet, M ‘Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the 
United States of America: An Empirical Investigation’ (2006) Vol 33 No. 1 Journal of Law and Society 162). 
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mechanisms has been buttressed by executive orders and judicial decisions generally 
decided in favour of minority empowerment.65 
 
2.2.3 Evaluation of the Preference Policy 
 The procurement preferences have been relatively successful in empowering minority 
businesses.66 The 5% participation target was reached at state level by1993, and contracts to 
minority firms accounted for 6.4% of the overall dollar value.67 Furthermore, between 1982 
and 1991, there was a 24% increase of all ‘federal procurement contracts’ in excess of USD 
25 00068 with similar trends apparent at state level.69 This statistical evidence is ,however, 
undermined by the realities on the ground that indicate a general inability of beneficiaries to 
cope with the contracts that they are awarded, thereby affecting the sustainability of minority 
enterprises.70 Another insidious weakness is evidenced by the programme’s failure to realise 
its subsidiary objective of unemployment reduction.71 Due to these conflicting indicators, it is 
difficult to make a final evaluation of the US empowerment endeavour. What is clear 
however, is that the US initiative has often been viewed with a jaundiced eye.72  
 
 In light of this historical and international context, this essay will now turn to focus 
on the nature of the SA Empowerment programme: Black Economic Empowerment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65
 For example see, Executive Order 11246 of 1965, the Philadelphia Order of 1969; Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 
U.S 448 (1979); United States v Paradise 48 US 149 (1987) and  Grutter v Bolinger 539 US 306 (2003) as cited 
in Brunner ‘Timeline of Affirmative Action Milestones’: 
http:///www.infoplease.com/spot/affirmativetimeline1.html (Accessed 30/07/05). 
66
 Lewis (n 59).  
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 ‘Agency-level data show that for example between 1985 and 1994, contracting with SDB’s grew from 2.1% 
of  Department of Defence procurement to 5.5%, an increase of more than 3 billion’. (Lewis (n 59)) 
70
 Bates et al cited in Chay and Fairlie ‘Minority business set-asides and black self-employment’ (1998) at p 6 at 
http://econ.ucsc.edu/~fairlie/papers/setaside.pdf#search=%22preferential%20procurement%20the%20USA%20for%20
minorities%22 (Accessed on 21/06/2006) as cited in Safi ‘How Broad is Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: 
A critical Analysis of the Challenges facing BEE’ Unpublished LLB Mini-Dissertation, University of Cape Town 
(2006) at 10. Also see Sweet ‘Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical 
Investigation’ (2006) Vol 33 No. 1 Journal of Law and Society 169.  
71
 Sweet, M ‘Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical Investigation’ 
(2006) Vol 33 No. 1 Journal of Law and Society 180.  
72
 Sweet (n 71) 180.  
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3. BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT  
 
 
3.1  BEE: A REITERATION 
 
 As highlighted above, BEE is necessary to remedy the economic imbalances 
perpetuated during Apartheid. At the introduction of democracy,73 discussions were held as 
to the best strategy to pursue BEE.74  After 1995, these discussions resulted in active 
involvement by the public and private sectors through which multiple initiatives sought to 
spread economic power within the Black population.75 By 1997, the Black Management 
Forum (BMF) perceived that BEE was not going well,76 and the independent BEE 
Commission (BEECom) was consequently established in 199877 to ascertain the challenges 
hindering significant Black participation and propose a viable BEE strategy.78 The BEECom 
subsequently released a comprehensive report on BEE in 200079 prescribing an Integrated 
National BEE Strategy as a solution to the BEE complexities,80 and recommended that 
national legislation be enacted to facilitate empowerment.81 This recommendation culminated 
in the enactment of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 
(BBBEE Act) to be analysed below. 
 
As it stands, BEE is a process aimed at strategically transforming the SA economy82 
by, inter alia ,spreading equity holdings to incorporate previously disadvantaged South 
                                                 
73
 The first democratic elections were held in 1994. 
74
 Osode ( n 3)108. 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 http://www.southafrica.info/pls/procs/iac.page?p_t1=692&p_t2=3185&p_t  (Accessed on 14/04/05). 
80
 Osode (n 3) 109. 
81
 The Act would be ‘specifically aimed at the achievement of four goals: i) [the provision] of an unambiguous 
definition of BEE…; ii) [the provision] of uniform guidelines… against which the public and private sectors 
could measure their [BEE] performance…, iii) [the provision] of procurement targets of public sector 
departments[ and lastly, the setting out of a requirement that] all government departments submit an annual 
BEE report. (Osode (n 3) 109.  
82
 Woolley ‘Everyone’s Guide to Black Economic Empowerment and how to implement it’ (2005) Financial 
Mail 12 & 31. 
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Africans,83re-organising management structures,84 and ensuring greater participation of the 
majority in the economy in order to ensure ‘economic justice’.85 
 
 BEE is governed by several instruments and this paper will now turn to provide an 
overview of the BEE regulatory framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83
 BEE as defined by Old Mutual extracted from Kennedy ‘Black Economic Empowerment in the South African 
Business Community: A Beginning of Economic Empowerment of Black South Africans’ (1997) MBA Thesis: 
Graduate School of Business University of Cape Town 61.  
84
 http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleID=2605708 (Accessed on 30/07/2005).  
85
 Osode (n 3) 107.  
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4. THE BEE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
 
This section of the paper will entail a critical discussion of the constitutional 
imperative, the BBBEE Act,86 The Codes of Good Practice (the Codes),87 the Sector 
Transformation Charters (the Transformation Charters) and the BEE Strategy Document (the 
Strategy Document).As a precursor to this discussion a summary of the legal status of the 
instruments is in order. It is submitted that the regulatory instruments governing BEE rest in 
the following hierarchy, listed from most to least binding: The Constitution;88 the BBBEE 
Act;89 the Codes; the Transformation Charters,90 and finally the Strategy Document.  
 
4.1  BEE: A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE  
 BEE is a constitutional imperative, however the pursuit of BEE poses a paradox that 
stems from the framing of the right to equality.91 On the one hand s 9 (2) imposes an 
obligation on the state to undertake ‘legislative and other measures to protect persons 
disadvantaged from unfair discrimination’.92 On the other hand, it has been argued that BEE 
                                                 
86
 Act 53 of 2003.  
87
 Cliffe Dekker Attorneys uses ‘the following format to describe individual statements in the Codes: C000S000 
represents Code 000 Statement 000, and C100S100 represents Code 100 Statement 100’ and so on. (Cliffe 
Dekker ‘The Way to BEE’ at http://bee.sabinet.co.za?CD_Way2BEE_guide.pdf (Accessed on 29/01/07).) 
I will adopt this same format in this paper. 
88The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
89
 Act 53 of 2003.  
90
 Van der Merwe for Werksmans Attorneys ‘BEE and the Regulatory Environment’ (2004) Empowerment 
2004 Black Ownership: Risk or Opportunity in Business Map Foundation 32.  
91
 The right to equality is embodied in Section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9 provides: 
‘ (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
  (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
  (3) The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one of more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
  (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone one or more grounds listed in 
terms of sub section  
  (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
  (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair’.  
The right to equality has been dealt with extensively in the constitutional cases of Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) 
SA 300 (CC) and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 
paras 60-1.  
92
 Section 9 (2) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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amounts to reverse racism93 thus constituting a breach of s 9 (3) of the Constitution, which 
prohibits the state from unfairly discriminating against any person on the listed grounds of, 
inter alia, race and gender.94 It is submitted that BEE prima facie amounts to unfair 
discrimination, but that it is seen as protection of the substantive right to equality95 and is 
thus reasonable and justifiable in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.96 In the Constitutional 
Court case of Bato Star,97 Ngcobo J succinctly encapsulates the nature and implications of 
this constitutional imperative, stating that  
 
…transformation is required by…the Constitution…and change sometimes comes at a cost…There are 
profound challenges facing our nation in meeting our constitutional commitment to transformation. 
The transformation process will inevitably have adverse effects on some individuals particularly those 
who have been advantaged…[but] these are some of the challenges we will have to confront as a 
nation in transition.98 
 
4.2  THE BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC   
        EMPOWERMENT ACT 53 OF 2003  
 
The BBBEE Act99 is legislation as envisaged by s 9(2) of the Constitution and is the 
primary regulatory instrument of BEE. The BBBEE Act100 provides a skeletal framework for 
the programme in general - it not only defines BEE, but also enables the instruments that rest 
beneath it in the regulatory hierarchy and establishes the BEE Advisory Council.  Although 
                                                 
93
 ‘Mbeki Speaks out on BEE racism’ at 
http://www.skillsportal.co.za/black_economic_empowerment/415010.htm (Accessed on 14/04/05). 
94
 Section 9 (3) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
95
 Formal equality requires ‘the law to treat all individuals the same regardless of their actual social and 
economic circumstances’, whereas substantive equality takes these circumstances into account.  (De Waal et al 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 184.)  
96
 Section 36 of the Constitution provides: 
‘ (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all the relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and the its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
   (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or any other provision in the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights’. 
97
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 
106.  
98
 Ibid.  
99
 Act 53 of 2003.  
100
 Ibid.  
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the BBBEE Act101 is framed in broad terms this is, in general, unproblematic because it is 
supplemented by the detailed directives contained in the Codes. The BBBEE Act102 is 
relatively uncontroversial, however the definitions section deserves some attention.  
 
The term ‘broad-based black economic empowerment’ is defined as ‘economic 
empowerment,…through a non-exhaustive list of diverse but integrated socio-economic 
strategies’.103 It is submitted that the non-exhaustive list is compatible with the dynamism of 
BEE and the multi- dimensional socio-economic objective,104 and affords government the 
leeway to adopt additional strategies not already enumerated in the Act.105 This open-ended 
list provides flexibility and is a clear strength of the Act.106  
  
The beneficiaries of the Act107 are ‘Black people’ defined as Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians.108 This broad definition extends further to include ‘women, workers, youth, people 
with disabilities and people living in rural areas’.109 It is clear that this definition specifically 
mentions groups ‘historically [susceptible] to disempowerment’110 and thus reflects the 
intention of the legislature to spread preferences beyond the ‘new Black elite’.111 This 
definition has been qualified by C000S000,112 which limits ‘Black people’ to natural persons 
who are ‘citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth or descent…or by naturalisation 
before the [commencement of the Interim Constitution in 1993]’113 or who, were it not for 
                                                 
101
 Ibid.  
102
 Ibid.  
103
 Section 1 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003 and Osode (n 3) 110. S 1 provides that ‘These strategies include but 
are not limited to – 
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; 
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, 
cooperatives and other collective enterprises; 
(c) human resources and skills development; 
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; 
(e) preferential procurement; and  
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people’. 
104
 Osode (n 3) 111.   
105
 Osode ( n 3) 111.   
106
 Act 53 of 2003. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Section 1 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003 and Osode ( n 3) 112. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Osode (n 3)112. 
111
 Osode (n 3) 111.   
112
 C000S000 of 2005 : Department of  Trade and Industry (Phase One 2005 Codes) Code 000 ‘Framework for 
the Measurement of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment : Statement 000 ‘The Organisation of the 
Codes of Good Practice, The Elements of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment’ at www.dti.gov.za 
(Accessed on 29/01/07). 
113
 C000S000 of 2005  (n 112) para 1.3.1 and para 1.3.2.  
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the pre-1993 Apartheid regulations, would have been entitled to be naturalised prior to the 
commencement of the Interim Constitution, but only acquired citizenship after its 
enactment.114 This supplementation of the definition by C000S000115 serves to counter 
previous arguments that the BBBEE Act116 failed to limit the scope of BEE to victims of 
Apartheid, and also serves to illustrate the manner in which the Codes flesh out the space that 
the Act117 carves.  
  
Two interesting issues arise from this definition of ‘Black people’. First, under 
Apartheid people were classified as either Black, White, Coloured or Asian.118 Although the 
Asian group mostly constituted Indians,119 other races considered Asian,120 for example 
Chinese people, are not covered by the Act.121 This is a clear oversight on the part of the 
legislature.  The second issue relates to the mention of communities as qualified candidates 
of BEE. This is encouraging for those who support ‘communitarianism’,122 however, whether 
communities will realistically materialise as beneficiaries (especially in light of the present 
preoccupation of empowerment through equity transfer and management control)123 will 
depend on how well the BEE custodians organise and support them.124  
 
Apart from these concerns, the BBBEE Act125 is a commendable piece of legislation, 
and many potential shortcomings are more than likely compensated for by the comprehensive 
Codes of Good Practice.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
 C000S000 of 2005 (n 112) para 1.3.3.  
115
 C000S000 of 2005 (n 112).  
116
 Act 53 of 2003. 
117
 Ibid.  
118
 ‘History of Apartheid in South Africa’ at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid#Colour_classification 
(Accessed on 04/02/07).  
119
 Ibid.   
120
 For example the ‘Chinese were classified [under Apartheid] as either non-European or non-white’. Danwei 
‘Chinese Fight to be Black’ http://www.danwei.org/china_and_africa/chinese_fight_to_be_black.php  
(Accessed on 05/02/07).  
121
 Act 53 of 2003.  
122
 Osode (n 3) 111.  
123
 Balshaw et al Cracking Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: Codes and Scorecard unpacked 76. 
124
 Osode (n 3)111.  
125
 Act 53 of 2003.  
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4.3 THE CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE126 
Section 9 of the Act127 empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry to issue Codes 
of Good Practice on BEE.128 In issuing these Codes the Minister must take into account a 
strategy issued in terms of s 11129 which ‘may specify targets consistent with objectives of 
the Act as well as the period within which those targets must be achieved’.130 In terms of s 9, 
the procedure for the issuance of the Codes entails the publication of a draft code for public 
comment in the Gazette, with a 60 day provision for interested persons to submit their input 
on the content of the draft.131 
 
In substantial compliance with the above procedure, the first phase of the Codes were 
tabled and released for public comment by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 
December 2004 (The Phase One 2004 Codes).132 The final draft of phase one was released in 
November 2005 (The Phase One 2005 Codes).133  Drafting of the second phase of the Codes 
commenced in April 2005, and the final draft was released in December 2005 (The Phase 
Two 2005 Codes).134 Both phases have since been approved by Cabinet and, at time of 
writing, it was projected that both sets of Codes would be gazetted early 2007 which will 
render them official.135 
 
Before the Codes were instituted, the Strategy Document136 and several 
Transformation Charters137 governed BEE, but these instruments fell short in several 
respects.138 The Strategy did not provide practical guidelines for implementation, and 
disparities between the Transformation Charters in relation to definitions, standards, and 
                                                 
126
 These will be referred to as the Codes.  
127
 Act 53 of 2003 
128
 Section 9 (1) of Act 53 of 2003 provides: ‘ In order to promote the purposes of the Act, the Minister may by 
notice in the Gazette issue codes of good practice on black economic empowerment…’. 
129
 S 9 (2) of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003. 
130
 S 9 (3) of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003. Phraseology extracted from (Osode (n 3) 114. 
131
 S 9 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003.  
132
  The Department of Trade and Industry ‘The Codes of Good Practice on Black Economic Empowerment – 
Phase One: A Guide to interpreting the First Phase of the Codes’ (2005) p 5 at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/Chapterone_1_11.pdf (accessed on 26/06/2006). This will be referred to as The DTI 
Guide to Interpretation from hereon in.  
133
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 5. 
134
 ‘Black Economic Empowerment: Regulatory Article’ (15 Feb 2006) at 
http://bee.sabinet.co.za/bee_regulatory_article2.html (Accessed on 05/02/07).  
135
 ‘Cabinet gives green light to Codes of Good Practice’ 7 December 2006 at 
http://www.gov.za/article/articleview.asp?current+1&arttypeid=1&artid=1350 (Accessed on 19/12/06). 
136
 Discussed in para 4.5 below.  
137
 Discussed in para 4.4 below.  
138
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 2.  
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targets in the implementation of BEE resulted in disparate progress,139 BEE deals falling 
short of the empowerment standard,140 and leeway for entities to evade the requirements of 
the BBBEE Act.141 In an endeavour to counteract these systemic difficulties, the BBBEE 
Act142 was enacted in 2004. Although the Act143 provided some clarity, it is couched in broad 
terms and thus did not serve in itself to remedy the lack of specificity in the framework. The 
Codes seek to address these shortcomings and intend to standardise the definition of ‘broad-
based BEE’ as well as to benchmark measurement principles in the interests of clarity and 
certainty.144  They are an endeavour to provide uniform regulations and indicators for 
empowerment transactions concluded in every sector,145 and ensure that companies not 
accounted for by the Charters are included in the purview of empowerment.146 An additional 
objective of the Codes is the institution of structures that facilitate the implementation and 
appraisal of the initiative. In this vein, the Codes make provision for the institution of 
verification and accreditation agencies that are intended to facilitate, standardise, and validate 
BEE transactions.147 In a nutshell the Codes were designed to ensure ‘real empowerment’148 
by giving content to the regulatory framework and unifying the system. 
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 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132)3.  
140
 Singh & Jekwa et al ‘Cracking the Codes’(2005)  Financial Mail April 15 at 19. 
141
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 3.  
142
 Act 53 of 2003. 
143
 Ibid.  
144
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 3.  
145
 Singh (n 140) 19. 
146
 Ibid 
147
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 3.  Verification and Accreditation Agencies are discussed in para 
4.3.4 below. 
148
 Singh (n 140) 19. Real empowerment means that beneficiaries should be able to service their debt and thus 
take ownership of shares allocated to them. (Singh (n 140) 19).  
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4.3.1. The Structure and Content of the Codes 
There are three core components and seven sub-elements of BBBEE. These are 
reflected diagrammatically below.149 
 
 dirdireDDD  
           
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first component is that of ‘Direct Empowerment’, which comprises the 
‘Ownership’ and ‘Management’ elements; secondly, the ‘Human Resource Development’ 
component, which comprises the ‘Employment Equity’ and ‘Skills Development’ elements; 
and lastly ‘Indirect Empowerment’, which comprises the ‘Preferential Procurement’, 
‘Enterprise Development’ and ‘Residual’ elements.150 The overall structure of the codes is 
based on these categories, with phase 1 containing the ‘Direct Empowerment’ component, 
and phase 2 detailing the ‘Human Resource Development, and ‘Indirect Empowerment’ 
ones.151 Charts detailing the specifics of the Codes are attached as APPENDIX 1.152  
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 Balshaw (n 123) 76.  
150
  C000S000 of 2004: Department of Trade and Industry (Phase One 2004 Codes): Code 000 ‘BBBEE 
Framework’: Statement 000 Principles and Definitions of BBBEE at paras 41-55 at www.dti.gov.za (Accessed 
on 19/12/06). Also see Balshaw (n 123) 75-76. As a matter of interest, the residual element includes Corporate 
Social Development.  
151
 The DTI Guide to Interpretation (n 132) 6.  
152
 It should be noted that separate Codes apply to Qualifying Small Enterprises. A discussion of these Codes 
falls outside the ambit of this paper. However, in the interests of providing a holistic picture, a chart depicting 
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4.3.2 The Binding Nature of the Codes of Good Practice  
Section 10 of the BBBEE Act153 states that ‘Every organ of state and public entity 
must154 take into account and, as far as is reasonably possible, apply any relevant Code of 
Good Practice issued in terms of [the] Act’.155 The use of the word must indicates the 
mandatory obligation on the state and public entities to comply with the Codes when 
determining licences, concessions, procurement policies,156 ‘the sale of state owned 
enterprises’,157 and ‘the entering into partnerships with the private sector’.158 However, the 
BBBEE Act159 is silent on the obligation of private enterprises to comply with the Codes. In 
order for the Codes to be implemented it is crucial that state and private entities interact and 
collaborate.  Despite the importance of such co-operation, the Codes oddly only bind public 
entities. This unilateral binding nature of the Codes renders them sui generis and this paper 
will now turn to investigate their precise legal nature.  
  
 The point of departure in determining the legal nature of the Codes will be to 
investigate the characteristics of the instruments. The Codes are regulatory instruments 
envisaged by the BBBEE Act,160 and are issued by the Minister in the gazette. Power has 
thus been delegated to the Minister by the legislature for their issuance and on this score the 
Codes meet the definition of the recent phenomenon termed ‘delegated legislation’. 161 The 
purpose behind delegated legislation is to enable effective implementation of primary 
legislation, which is usually phrased in broad terms. In light of this, it appears that the Codes 
may be classified as delegated legislation.  
                                                 
153
 Act 53 of 2003. 
154
 My emphasis.  
155
 Section 10 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003 provides: ‘Every organ of state and public entity must take into 
account and, as far as is reasonably possible, apply any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this 
Act in- 
(a) determining qualification criteria for the issuing of licences, concessions or other authorisations in terms of 
any law; 
(b) developing and implementing a preferential procurement policy; 
(c) determining qualification criteria for the sale of state owned enterprises; and 
(d) developing criteria for entering into partnerships with the private sector’.  
156
 Section 10 (a) and (b) of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003  
157
 Section 10 (c) of the BBBEE Act of 53 of 2003.  
158
 Section 10 (d) of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003.  
159
 Act 53 of 2003. 
160
 Ibid.  
161
 Hofman, J Chapter 2 ‘Legislators and legislation’ in a forthcoming work Interpreting legislation in South 
Africa to be published by Ampersand Press in 2007 at 25 – 26. ‘The Constitution refers to delegate legislation 
as “subordinate legislation” or “laws made in terms of an Act of Parliament or provincial Act”’. ( Hofman (n 
161) 26).  
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This conclusion may be doubtful however, when one considers the fact that delegated 
legislation usually takes the form of regulations or proclamations.162 Furthermore, s14 of the 
Act163 makes specific provision for the Minister to make regulations to ensure proper 
implementation of the Act. It is unlikely that the legislature would have made separate 
provision for the same species of instrument to regulate similar issues. This would be an 
unwarranted duplication unnecessarily adding to the complexity of the already labyrinthine 
regulatory framework. The duplication may perhaps be seen as legislative over provision 
inserted ex abundanti cautela,164 however this conclusion is debatable. It is submitted that the 
Codes do, in so far as they relate to state entities, amount to delegated legislation as they 
fulfil the essentialia of delegated legislation. This submission is fortified by the fact that 
delegated legislation may exist in forms other than regulations or proclamations, the ultimate 
determination of delegated legislation being one of substance and not form.165 This paper 
argues that the rationale for the provision of two ‘subordinate’ instruments of the same 
species is to add greater flexibility to the regulatory regime. Although s 9 (1) and s 9 (3) of 
the Act166 list factors that may167 be included in the Codes, they are in fact limited in their 
mandatory application to state entities.168 It is submitted that the provision in the Act169 for 
the enactment of regulations over and above the Codes affords the Minister leeway not only 
to expound on issues that may amplify the efficacy of the framework, but more pertinently, 
to cater for the enactment of rules that may be binding on the private sector.   
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 Hofman (n 161) 27. 
163
 Section 14 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003 provides: ‘The Minister may make regulations with regard to any 
maTter that it is necessary to prescribe in order to ensure the proper implementation of this Act’.  
164
 Navidas (Pty) Ltd v Essop; Metha v Essop 1994 (4) SA 141 (A).  
165
 Hofman (n 161) 27. 
166
 Section 9 (1) of Act 53 of 2003 provides: ‘ In order to promote the purposes of the Act, the Minister may by 
notice in the Gazette issue codes of good practice on black economic empowerment that may include- 
(a) the further interpretation and definition of broad-based black economic empowerment and the 
interpretation and definition of different categories of black economic empowerment entities; 
(b) qualification criteria for preferential purposes for procurement and other economic activities; 
(c) indicators to measure broad-based economic empowerment; 
(d) the weighting to be attached to broad-based black economic empowerment indicators referred to 
in paragraph (c);  
(e) guidelines for stakeholders in the relevant sectors of the economy to draw up transformation 
charters for their sector; and  
(f) any other matters necessary to achieve the objectives of this Act’. 
 Section 9 (3) of Act 53 of 2003 provides: ‘A Code of Good Practice issued in terms of subsection (1) may 
specify- 
(a) targets consistent with the objectives of this Act; and  
(b) the period within which those targets must be achieved’.  
167Discretion is indicated by use of the word may.  
168
 Section 10 of the BBBEE Act 53 of 2003. 
169
 Act 53 of 2003. 
  
30 
 
 The status of the Codes as they relate to the private sector is ambiguous because the 
Act170 is silent on the obligation of private entities to comply with them. According to the 
rules of statutory interpretation the starting point is that the ambit of the Act is restricted to 
that which is expressly stated.171 Thus the Act’s failure to mention private entities in s 10 
points to the fact that the Codes are not legally binding on them. However, provisions may 
sometimes be implied if the three stage ‘implied provision test’ is discharged. This test 
requires first, that the implied provision must be necessary and not merely convenient,172 
secondly, that the provision must be necessary to make the legislation effective,173 and lastly, 
that the provision must be capable of clear and precise formulation.174 In casu, the last 
requirement appears unproblematic. The first two requirements are also met if one views the 
private sector as so integral to the implementation of BEE that without its compulsory 
inclusion, BEE would be unworkable. If this is accepted, then private entities are included 
within the ambit of s 10 by implication. This proposition is also reinforced by the fact that 
BEE is a constitutional imperative requiring joint effort between public and private sectors to 
bring it to fruition. On this basis, it may be suggested that the Codes are legally binding on 
the private sector.  
   
However, in light of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,175 the implied 
provision test is not easily discharged. Furthermore, a trite canon of interpretation states that 
unless the interpretation of a provision leads to incongruity or absurdity, the express statutory 
meaning prevails.176 The omission of private entities from the section cannot be viewed as 
absurd (notwithstanding the integral participation required by the private sector for the 
effective implementation of BEE) if one looks to the proposed intention of the legislature in 
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omitting them. The intention is to respect the economic realm of free enterprise, which is 
necessary for the nurturing of entrepreneurial spirit as well as for economic growth.177 To 
impose a mandatory obligation on private industry would stifle competition through the 
dictation of resource usage, and would result in an unsustainable (and unfeasible) 
empowerment endeavour.178  
 
Ultimately the implementation of BEE is a strategic business decision179 made with 
the awareness of resource capacity, growth potential, market forces and, most importantly, 
survival imperatives. It should be noted however, that should private entities choose to 
embark on BEE strategies, the regulatory guidelines contained in the Codes become 
applicable.180  
 
This begs the question - what then is the legal nature of the Codes as viewed from the 
private sector perspective? In investigating this issue, this paper will look at other 
instruments that are termed ‘codes’ to ascertain whether the status attributable to these 
instruments may be instructive in determining the legal nature of the BEE Codes.181  
 
The first set of ‘codes’ to be considered is the Security Regulation Code on Take-
overs and Mergers (SRC).182 The Securities Regulation Panel established in terms of s 440 B 
of the Companies Act183 is responsible for the issue of the SRC. The SRC provides an 
‘orderly framework’184 of rules and guidelines for takeover and merger activities and applies 
to all listed companies and to all persons involved in such transactions.185  It aims to ensure 
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fairness and equality between all security holders 186 and expressly provides that it ‘enjoys 
the force of law’.187  
 
An investigation of the King Code II188  reveals that it constitutes a ‘set of principles 
[that] does not purport to determine the detailed course of conduct of directors on any 
particular matter’,189 but merely to guide companies in determining the ‘best available 
practice’ 190 when considering other regulatory instruments which apply to them.191 The King 
Code II applies to what are termed ‘affected companies’192 and all such companies are urged 
to duly consider the King Code insofar as its principles are relevant.193  
 
Schedule 8 (the Labour Code) issued in terms of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 194 
is another useful comparator. The Definitions section of the LRA195 expressly excludes 
Schedule 8 as being a part of the ‘Act’ as defined.196 The inference that can be drawn is that 
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Schedule 8, in the absence of a clear articulation of its legal nature, may be regarded as a 
lower order instrument to those grouped together as forming part of the ‘Act’. The Labour 
Code (aimed at promoting mutual respect in employer-employee relationships) outlines 
guidelines on dismissal issues in general terms197 and expressly permits deviation from the 
norms contained therein.198 
 
What can be deduced from the above analysis is that the highest common factor of 
these ‘codes’ is that they are guidelines in the form of rules, principles or norms. What is also 
apparent is that in the absence of an express provision in the ‘codes’ attributing the binding 
force of law, the codes appear to be mere guidelines that buttress regulatory frameworks. 
They may thus be regarded as what is termed ‘soft law’.199 ‘Soft’ law is not law proper200 and 
thus is not enforceable in a court of law.201 Soft law is made up of ‘written instruments that 
are not intended to be legally binding,’202 but that are so central to the legal regulatory 
framework203 that they cannot merely be discarded as ‘non-law’.204 Figuratively speaking, 
‘…there exists a considerable “grey area” of “soft law” between the white space of law and 
the black territory of non-law…the “grey area” may greatly affect the white one and…“soft 
law” can have legal effects’.205 
 
This ‘soft law’ status of these ‘codes’ indisputably obtains to the BEE Codes (as they 
relate to the private sector).The BEE Codes do not expressly confer the force of law unto 
themselves, but do serve as non-binding guidelines for the implementation of BEE by the 
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private sector. Furthermore, they are of such importance and influence to the BEE 
regulatory structure that they warrant special attention.206 It can thus be concluded that the 
legal status of the Codes (from the private sector perspective) is that of ‘soft law’. 
 
 In light of this conclusion, it is necessary to ascertain how the government has 
enforced these non-binding codes so as to regulate commerce and ensure compliance with 
BEE. It is to this end that this paper will now turn. 
 
4.3.3 Implementation 
 4.3.3.1 The Mechanism  
A BBBEE Scorecard has been issued by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
as a Code of Good practice.207  The Scorecard is intended to gauge progress made towards 
BEE by enterprises subject to the Codes. The Scorecard works on a weighted average, and 
allocates points to seven criteria: (i) Ownership (20 points); (ii) Management (10 points); (iii) 
Employment Equity (10 points); (iv) Skills development (20 points); (v) Preferential 
Procurement (20 points); (vi) Enterprise Development (10 points), and (vii) Residual element 
(10 points).208  
 
In terms of s10 of the Act,209 every organ of state and public entity210 is required to 
consider and apply this Code in: ‘determining the qualification criteria for the issuing of 
licences; concessions or other authorisations in terms of any law; developing and 
implementing a preferential procurement policy; determining the qualification criteria for the 
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sale of state owned enterprises and; developing criteria for entering into [public or private 
partnerships]’.211 It is submitted that a ‘carrot-stick’ approach has been adopted to ensure 
compliance with the Codes in that adherence to the BEE standards stipulated in the Codes 
enhances prospects of success in tenders for government patronage, in applications for 
licences, in authorisations for projects or in the granting of concessions.212 This is the same 
approach that was adopted in Malaysia to enforce the restructuring programme.213 
 
In instances where private entities do not transact directly with the state or with state 
entities, the ‘cascade effect’214 pressurises private entities that transact inter se to comply 
with the Codes. This ‘cascade effect’ works as follows- enterprises that do transact directly 
with the state strive to attain the highest BEE score possible for reasons mentioned above. 
One of the ways to improve this score is by procuring goods and services from BEE 
compliant suppliers as this will count towards the procurer’s ‘preferential procurement’ score 
of the BEE Scorecard.215 This process will replicate itself throughout the supply chains of 
most industries, that is to say it will ‘cascade’ downward.216 Thus, in the interests of survival 
and competitive advantage, all suppliers at different tiers of the value chain will be pressured 
to become BEE compliant. Other factors that compel BEE compliance are for example, that 
banks are weary of extending credit to unempowered enterprises because such enterprises are 
prone to becoming bad debtors.217 A further risk is that directors of non-compliant companies 
may be burdened with claims for damages instituted by the company for breach of both their 
fiduciary obligations and their duties of care and skill.218  Compliance with the Codes is thus 
effected, notwithstanding the non-binding status of the Codes on private sector entities. 
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4.3.4. Verification Agencies  
 As stated above, an enterprise will be rated and accorded a BEE status based on its 
overall weighted average score as determined by application of the BEE Scorecard. This 
rating is calculated by an accredited Verification Agency that will issue a valid Verification 
Certificate reflecting the BEE status of the measured entity. 219  
 
Verification Agencies were established in response to the problems encountered in 
the early 1990’s.220 During this period there were no standard measures to evaluate and 
compare different entities BEE progress,221 however with the advent of Verification 
Agencies, a mechanism now exists to verify BEE contributions and to ascertain the accuracy 
of an entity’s reported BEE status.222 Despite this innovation, there is still the risk of 
disparate verification methodologies.223 To avert this danger, the Minister in collaboration 
with an Accreditation Body224 must ‘accredit only those verification agencies which 
meet…[specified] criteria225.., thereby ensuring that standards are uniform’.226  
 
4.3.5 Conclusion on the Codes of Good Practice  
 This section has detailed the nature and content of the Codes of Good Practice as well 
as analysed their legal nature. In light of the sui generis nature of the Codes, they are 
implemented through an ingenious ‘carrot-stick’ mechanism facilitated by accredited BEE 
rating agencies. The penultimate instruments to be addressed are the Sector Transformation 
Charters.  
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4.4 THE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION CHARTERS  
 The BEE Transformation Charters are sector specific regulatory instruments 
voluntarily developed by stakeholders in a particular industry together with government 
departments.227 Transformation Charters reflect a sectors commitment to BEE228 and are 
gazetted ‘for general information’ purposes in terms of s 12 of the Act.229 Furthermore, they 
aim to guide transformation230 and to prescribe the benchmark for BEE compliance that 
entities in a particular sector must meet.231  
 
4.4.1 Legal Status of the Sector Transformation Charters  
The status of the Transformation Charters is ascertainable through a comparative 
evaluation with the status of the Codes.232 It is submitted that the Transformation Charters 
are legally subordinate to the Codes and by implication assume an inferior legal status to 
both delegated legislation and soft law. This can be gleaned from the bodies responsible for 
the enactment of the respective instruments. The Codes are issued by the Minister, whereas 
the Transformation Charters are formulated by industry and only then gazetted on approval 
by the Minister. Furthermore, the Act233 expressly states that the Transformation Charters are 
simply ‘for general information’ purposes.234 The Guide to Interpreting the Code235 reiterates 
this and also states that Transformation Charters are merely an expression of an industry’s 
‘commitment to transformation’.236 In light of the above considerations, it is submitted that 
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the Charters can be classified as voluntary partnership agreements binding only  private 
sector signatories.237  
 
4.4.2 The Sector Transformation Charters in Perspective 
 In an attempt to illustrate the content of the Charters this paper provides, in 
APPENDIX 3, a telescopic picture of the Transformation Charters governing the Mining, 
Financial Services and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sectors. The last 
instrument to be discussed is the BEE Strategy Document.  
 
4.5 THE BEE STRATEGY DOCUMENT  
The Strategy Document was the initial regulatory instrument issued by the Minister 
and served as a general framework for BEE.238 It contained a basic scorecard with percentage 
weightings239 (and it is upon this Card that the present Scorecard is modelled), but it did not 
outline governing principles, or how the scorecard was to be applied.240 Section 11 of the 
BBBEE Act241 now specifically mandates the Minister to release a Strategy Document, and it 
has been submitted that the initial Strategy is likely to be re-issued in terms of s 11.242 
Interestingly, once resting at the apex of the BEE regulatory hierarchy, the Strategy 
Document has since been relegated to the nadir of the pyramid on account of the detailed 
principles contained in the BBBEE Act,243 the Codes and the Transformation Charters.   
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4.6. CONCLUSION ON THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
In concluding this section on the regulatory framework, a final comment is salutary. 
On the one hand the regulatory framework is extremely complex. On the other hand, the 
comprehensiveness of the framework admirably caters for the nuances of the enterprise as 
well as provides a solid foundation to facilitate the realisation of BEE objectives. As a result 
of the latter point, BEE has been made some progress, and this paper will now turn to review 
these strides.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
40 
5. BEE PROGRESS: MARGINAL STRIDES 
 
 
 BEE as a work in progress has made marginal strides and this section of the paper 
intends to analyse this advancement. This assessment will be made by looking at a number of 
BEE deals that have been concluded in the mining, financial and ICT sectors, and by 
reviewing the extent of equity transfer in the listed environment.   
 
5.1 BEE DEALS  
A common method of gauging BEE progress is to look at BEE deals that have been 
concluded over the years. The Johnnic deal was the first big and ‘visible buy-in by black 
businessmen’244 and was regarded as the ‘symbolic birth of BEE’,245 and since then, 
numerous deals have been closed. Mining successes include, among others, the deal 
concluded in 2000 between Anglo Coal and Billiton and Eyesizwe, which resulted in the 
creation of the fourth largest coal producer in South Africa.246  In the financial sector, 
commendable schemes include the Old Mutual and the Nedbank deals both concluded in 
2005. The Old Mutual deal was valued at R7.2 billion, and entailed the sale of 12.75% of Old 
Mutual plc’s local businesses to black staff and black investors.247 The Nedbank deal 
comprised a bonus-share scheme with clients as the intended beneficiaries.248 In the ICT 
sector, a notable arrangement is the merger between Mthombo-IT (a black owned company) 
and EOH, a major player in the ICT field.249 For a more comprehensive outline of the deals 
concluded in these three sectors see APPENDIX 4.  
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Graph 1 below illustrates the total value of BEE deals from inception until 1996. 
As is apparent, the value of these deals has been significant.  
 
 
Graph1: Total deal value since inception (1996)250   
 
 Source: Shubane, K & Reddy, C ‘Behind The Deals’ (2005) BusinessMap Foundation:Economic 
Transformation and Empowerment 11.  
 
 
5.2 PROGRESS IN THE LISTED ENVIRONMENT 
Another indicator of BEE progress is the extent of equity ownership. There has been 
a notable increase in Black equity ownership and control of SA companies.251 Between 1993 
and 1997, Black ownership increased from under 1% to 15-18% in market capitalisation on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).252 Further patterns of equity ownership, between 
1997 and 2003, are reflected in Graph 2 below. (For a representation of figures in tabular 
form see APPENDIX 5). 
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Graph 2: Trends in Black Control, Market Capitalisation and the Number of Firms 
on the JSE253 
Source: Reddy, C ‘Empowerment on the JSE’ (2004) Empowerment 2004 Black Ownership: Risk or 
Opportunity in Business Map Foundation 57.  
   
Graph 2 above shows that notwithstanding the slight trough reflected in 2002-2003, 
the market capitalization pattern reflects a trend towards increased Black control on the 
JSE.254This advancement should not be overstated however, as there are contrary indicators. 
For example, in relation to the intended target of 25% for equity, direct Black ownership on 
the JSE amounts to a mere 1.6%.255 Furthermore, the Graph 3 below indicates that 
relationally, the number of BEE firms on the JSE is miniscule.256 As an aside, it should be 
noted that these equity control indicators provide merely a telescopic view of BEE 
performance as statistics in the unlisted environment are not considered.  
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  Graph 3: Number of Black Controlled firms relative to the entire JSE257 
 
   Source: Reddy, C ‘Empowerment on the JSE’ (2004) Empowerment 2004 Black Ownership: Risk or 
Opportunity in Business Map Foundation 56.  
 
The above analysis reveals that notwithstanding relative successes, BEE progress is 
far from stellar. This is more than likely due to the numerous challenges facing the BEE 
drive. The next part of this paper will address some of these issues, and in the interests of 
clarity these challenges will be divided into two broad categories - the first, dealing with 
challenges that are evident from the BEE regulatory framework itself and the second, 
discussing those that are external to this framework. 
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6. THE CHALLENGES: APPARENT HURDLES 
 
 
 There are several hurdles facing BEE. Some of these challenges arise from within the 
regulatory framework, however several are external to the governing structure. This paper 
will be limited to a critical analysis of the Codes, the Transformation Charters, and the Sector 
Codes. The external challenges that will be addressed are the problems of financing; the 
broadness of broad-based BEE, fraud, and constraints of attitude.  
 
6.1 CHALLENGES EVIDENT FROM THE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
6.1.1 The Codes of Good Practice and the Sector Transformation Charters  
Since their inception, the Codes and Transformation Charters have undergone 
dramatic change. Many of the original difficulties have been resolved, however several 
ambiguities linger. This section of the paper will turn to consider certain aspects of this 
evolutionary trajectory. This critical analysis will involve a discussion of the content of the 
Codes, and an assessment of the interrelationship between the Codes, the Transformation 
Charters and the Sector Codes. 
 
6.1.1.1. The Codes of Good Practice: A Critical Analysis  
The BEE Codes are commendable on two main scores. First, the most apparent 
strength is the detailed consideration of vital aspects of the endeavour as well as the inclusion 
of key entities within the ambit of application. The benefit of detail is the reduced margin of 
appreciation of these rules and their relevance.258 Secondly, in providing cross-sector 
standards, the Codes unify the system 259 and thus ensure a more even and wider spread of 
empowerment.260  Several commendable adjustments have been made to bolster these 
strengths. Nonetheless, certain problems remain, and worse still, new ones have been created. 
These issues will now be canvassed.  
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6.1.1.1.1 Content of the Codes of Good Practice 
Prior to the release of the approved Codes, changes made to them have never been 
more apparent. Prominent features of the Codes that reflect these changes are: the complexity 
of the Codes; the Scorecard targets, and the ‘Once Empowered Always Empowered 
Principle’.  
 
6.1.1.1.1.1 Complexity of the Codes: A Labyrinthine Regime Remedied? 
One of the most striking changes is the extent to which the Codes have been 
simplified and condensed. For as long as the Codes have been in existence, dissidents argued 
that the Codes were complex to the point of   inefficaciousness, standing to jeopardize the 
entire initiative and negatively impact on the economy.261 Some analysts noted that 
adherence to the Codes would impose arduous financial and administrative burdens requiring 
extensive professional advisory support services.262 Germien du Plessis, an equity partner at 
debt and equity specialists Bravura, noted that ‘the amount of information required in terms 
of preferential procurement, which forms only one component of the Scorecard, [was] 
comparable with tax law obligations and [came] down to an audit of a company’s entire 
supply chain’.263  
 
In reaction to these valid criticisms, the DTI has since attempted to alleviate the 
complexity of the Codes. The volume of the Codes has been drastically reduced, with several 
Statements being cut down to almost half of what they were before.264 A further notable trait 
is that the readability and understandability of the codes has increased immensely. This can 
largely be attributed to the fact that much philosophical and contextual detail has been 
removed, most definitions have been significantly abridged, and most commendably, the 
information which was previously conveyed in dense convoluted paragraphs, is now laid out 
succinctly in list form with numbered sub-paragraphs as guidance.265 These features have the 
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effect of transforming the Codes into a document akin to a practitioner’s manual. The DTI 
has further assisted by introducing a ‘Guide to Interpreting the Codes’266 as part of the First 
Phase of the Codes, which serves as a valuable interpretative aid clarifying several rules in 
useful diagrammatic and tabular form. These modifications are extremely laudable in making 
the Codes more ‘user-friendly’ and address the complexity problem to a large degree.  
 
Several features, on the other hand, raise the concern that perhaps the Codes have 
been oversimplified. One incidence is that the original Generic Scorecard has been stripped 
down to a mere indication of raw score points for each BEE Element without mention of 
corresponding targets, indicators or percentage weightings.267 (See APPENDIX 6 which 
reflects the 2004 comprehensive Scorecard in relation to the 2005 simplified Scorecard). The 
targets and indicators are now included only in the individual Element Scorecards as 
contained in the respective Statements. It is submitted that even if the removal of indicators 
and targets from the Generic Scorecard was done with a view to simplification, the omission 
of these crucial aspects of BEE measurement renders the primary BEE Scorecard inadequate 
and misleading, necessitating cumbersome cross-referral. The broad overview provided by 
the old Scorecard was useful, and in its previous form was relatively uncomplicated. It is 
submitted that the DTI has erred gravely in altering the Scorecard to this extent.  
 
A commendable alteration to the Generic Scorecard however, has been the change in 
calculation method when determining the total number of points earned, from a percentage 
weighted average to a raw point weighted average. The original method of converting the 
raw point score to a percentage score was a complicating and superfluous step in light of the 
fact that the total point calculation is out of a possible 100 points. This means that 
irrespective of whether a percentage or raw score is used, the statistical outcome will be the 
same. Interrelated issues that will now be considered are the targets and stipulated 
timeframes contained in the individual Element Scorecards.  
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6.1.1.1.1.2 Targets and Timing: An Issue of Realism  
A common criticism of the Codes has been that the targets are considered to be 
‘unrealistically high’ and are unlikely to be attained in the stipulated timeframe.268 A 2005 
Empowerdex Review of measurable listed entities showed that only one company reached 
the ‘excellent contributor’ rank, and only 26% of these entities were in a position to show 
even minimal compliance.269 In a recent report it was cogently argued that the 25% direct 
ownership target is ill conceived as it is unreasonable to expect black people to acquire 25% 
of all companies; even the commercially unsound ones.270 The Scorecard targets remain 
unchanged despite these concerns, but it is hoped that difficulties may be alleviated by the 
target leeway afforded by the Sector Codes to be discussed in para 6.1.1.1.2 below. The DTI 
has eased anxiety on the timing issue by professing to relax the timeframes stipulated for the 
elements comprising the Human Resource and Indirect Empowerment Components of 
BEE,271 however only time will reveal the sufficiency of this leniency.   
 
           6.1.1.1.1.3 The ‘Once Empowered Always Empowered Principle’: Perpetual  
                             Recognition  
The DTI has released a document that introduces a new dimension to the equity 
ownership element of the BEE Scorecard.272 The principle, coined the ‘once empowered 
always empowered principle’, is broadly predicated on the idea that a measured entity will 
still earn empowerment points on account of black equity participation even after these Black 
shareholders sell their interest in the entity.273 This idea has caused waves of controversy 
across the board and it is this ferocious debate that will be now be attended to.   
 
The initial stance taken by the Codes was that sale of Black equity resulted in the loss 
of BEE ownership points by the company concerned,274 the logic being to nurture long-term 
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ownership by Black investors.275 To secure these ownership points then, companies tend to 
institute ‘lock-in’ provisions to ensure that Black equity remains in Black hands.276  
However, the negative implications of this are two-fold. First, the scarcity of Black capital 
means that shareholders desirous to sell their shares to other Black shareholders are often 
unable to find liquid Black purchasers.277 This has the secondary effect of ‘forc[ing] Black 
shareholders [to remain in the company] and…see their paper wealth rise and fall without the 
ability to cash in’.278 It is argued that the ‘once empowered always empowered’ principle will 
obviate the need for such ‘lock-ins’, enabling Black shareholders to sell their equity to 
previously advantaged persons, while ensuring that  companies are still able to earn BEE 
ownership points.279  
 
The problem with this principle, so understood, is clear. Its application will inevitably 
result in short-term Black ownership defeating the objectives of the Codes,280 and ‘dilut[e] 
black influence’ considerably.281  A further concern is that investee companies are usually 
responsible for engineering BEE deal structures and, in terms of this principle, companies 
eager to expeditiously rid themselves of BEE shareholders may ‘structure deals that [are] 
unfavourable to the BEE partner’.282  
 
In an attempt to counter these adverse effects, the DTI proposes only partial 
recognition of BEE points by such companies. 283 This would mean that in order to score 
ownership points, companies would have to maintain a minimum share requirement by 
permitting Black investors to ‘cash in’ only part of their investment.284 This pragmatic 
compromise would enable long-term ownership, afford Black investors the freedom of equity 
trade, and allow companies to retain points depending on the ‘level of transformation 
achieved by the company prior to the partial sell-off of equity’.285 The problem remains 
however that, notwithstanding the suggested partial recognition middle-ground, the media 
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continues to broadcast that the ‘once empowered, always empowered principle’ is the tenet 
upon which the ownership scorecard centres. The responsibility rests with the DTI to dispel 
this misconception by widely publicizing the correct working of the rule in sufficient detail to 
pre-empt interpretative disputes.286  
 
6.1.1.1.2 Interrelationship between the Codes of Good Practice, the Sector Transformation  
   Charters and the Sector Codes  
 
The strength of the Transformation Charters is ironically also a weakness for BEE 
generally -the sector specificity of the Transformation Charters affords the opportunity for 
the particular empowerment needs of each sector to be catered for individually, 287 but it is 
this same specificity that causes disparate empowerment progress in BEE as a whole. 
Advocates of the Charter system argue that the ‘codes over-centralise issues’,288 and ignore 
both the specific strengths and weaknesses in need of redress,289 while proponents of the 
Codes emphasise the need for uniformity. The flare of this debate is fuelled by the inter-
relational bifurcation of the instruments which provide a basis for each of the polar 
arguments.  
 
The inconsistencies between the Codes and Transformation Charters have been a 
longstanding and highly contentious issue. The disparities in indicators, targets and 
weightings arose primarily because several Transformation Charters were developed before 
the institution of the Codes, the BEE Act, and even before the introduction of the Strategy on 
BBBEE, 290 leaving these Charters with little point of reference.291 Even Charters instituted 
after the Strategy were either loosely modelled on the scorecard as it appeared in the 
Strategy, or were a mere statement of a general commitment to the BBBEE philosophy.292 At 
the time of writing, disparities in equity targets were noted and are depicted in Table 1 below.  
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   Table 1: EQUITY TARGET INCONSISTENCIES 293  
 
 
 
 
THE CODES  
 
ICT CHARTER  
 
FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
CHARTER 
 
MINING 
INDUSTRY 
CHARTER  
 
 
EQUITY 
 
 
 
25% plus one vote 
gets the full 
ownership score 
but the shares 
must be paid up in 
full.  
 
 
35 % by 2010; 
30% by 2015 
subject to a range 
of conditions.  
 
 
10% equity, 
provided that the 
financial 
institution has a 
target of 33% of 
black directors on 
its board. A target 
of 25% black 
ownership at 
holding company 
level is set for 
2010.  
 
 
26% equity 
within 10 years.  
   Source: Singh, S & Jekwa, S et al ‘Cracking the Codes’ (April 15, 2005) Financial Mail at 19. Statistics  
   correct at time of writing.  
 
Such inconsistencies between the Codes and the Transformation Charters create 
uncertainty in the different sectors thus impeding empowerment transactions294 and deterring 
potential foreign investors. 295   
 
In response to the overwhelming proposals that the Transformation Charters be 
harmonised to the Codes, C000S010 of the Phase One 2004 Codes296 outlined a mechanism 
to unify the system while maintaining a degree of flexibility. The default position was that 
the Transformation Charters were to contain the same indicators, targets and weightings as 
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depicted in the Codes.297 However, subject to a number of conditions, these pointers and 
values could be deviated from. Sectors could set their own indicators if they could 
demonstrate that: 
 
‘a) the suggested indicator can best measure the sector’s contribution to that element of broad-based BEE; 
b) the suggested indicator reflects the key drivers within the sector related to that element of broad-based BEE; 
c) the suggested indicator is in line with sound economic principles, and d) reasons to support how the currently 
required indicator, as per the Code of Practice, does not measure the particular element of broad-based BEE 
adequately’.298  
 
In addition, Statement 010 mandated that ‘adequate justification’ be given if a Sector 
target ‘differ[ed] significantly’ from that in the Generic Scorecard.299 Lastly, weightings 
attributed to each BEE element300 could vary up to10% from those reflected in the Codes, 
however such variance was subject to a sub-minimum weighting of 5%.301 Again, ‘adequate 
justification’ for deviation had to be provided.302 A further qualification for this weighting 
variation to obtain was that ‘the total weighting for each individual component, ie direct 
empowerment, human resources and indirect empowerment, [had to] remain constant as per 
the Generic Scorecard…’.303    
 
This scheme reached a comfortable compromise between the two instruments. It 
enabled standardisation and consolidation of the regulatory system, while accommodating a 
degree of flexibility through the variation allowances.  
 
The 2005 Codes, in discussing Transformation Charters, make no mention of any of 
the above substantive aspects and focus almost exclusively on the procedural aspects that 
relate to the gazetting of Transformation Charters.304 This shift in focus could be a result of 
the recognition of the dual life of the Charters. On the one hand they, in and of themselves, 
serve to convey a commitment to BEE and, on the other hand, they are instrumental in that 
Sector Codes are often born of Transformation Charters. The cursory treatment of 
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Transformation Charters in paragraph 5 of C000S010305 may, it is submitted, be attributed 
to the capacity in which the Charters are being viewed that is, in and of themselves, and as 
such scant substance is not fatal. Substantive matters of inter-relationship and content 
become crucial when one views the Charters in their instrumental capacity and it is this that 
will now be explored.  
 
Paragraph 6 of C000S010306 of the new Codes permits the Minister ‘to develop 
Sector Codes or convert a Transformation Charter into a Sector Code’ provided a number of 
conditions are fulfilled.307 Fundamentally, the process requires sectors to apply in writing to 
the Minster attaching both an analysis of the Transformation Charter or proposed Sector 
Code drawn up by an ‘independent party appointed in consultation with the Minister’, as well 
as a copy of the Charter or proposed Sector Code that has been signed by sector stakeholders 
and by the Ministry in charge of that sector.308  Subject to public comment and ultimately the 
approval of the Minister, the final step is the official publication of either instrument in the 
gazette in terms of S 9 of the BEE Act.309 Once gazetted therefore, Sector Transformation 
Charters are converted to Codes of Good Practice,310 elevated from mere partnership 
agreements to, on the one end, delegated legislation from the public sector perspective and, 
on the other end, soft law status from the private sector perspective. 311  
 
Entities governed by a specific Sector Code will be measured in accordance with the 
Sector specific scorecard as it appears in that Code. 312 Despite the elevation of status to 
Codes of Good Practice, when any ‘uncertainty arises in the interpretation of a Sector Code’ 
the Generic Codes take precedence.313 Furthermore, the Generic Codes apply to sectors that 
are ungoverned by a Sector Code, notwithstanding the existence of a Sector Transformation 
Charter issued in terms of s 12 of the BEE Act.314  
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A shortcoming of the framing is that the new Generic Codes are only inadvertently 
instructive to drafters when it comes to matters of substance that sectors are to consider in the 
formulation of their Sector Codes. Information relating to what is required in terms of the 
content of the instruments is only referred to as part of what the ‘independent party’ is 
required to look for in formulating its analysis, and is not overtly directive to the Sector Code 
drafters in this regard.  
 
A further change is that the new Codes do not expressly inform drafters, as was the 
case in the 2004 Codes, that target and weighting deviations from the Generic Codes are 
permitted. It is only by inference that one can deduce that variations are allowed if one looks 
to the explanations that the ‘independent party’ needs to provide in their analysis, which 
includes an indication and explanation of any deviations apparent in the proposed Sector 
Code315 showing that any such divergences are ‘not inconsistent with the objectives of the 
Act’, do not ‘distort the operation of the Generic Codes’ and  are ‘adequately justified on 
sound commercial principles and/or developmental grounds pertaining to the sector’.316 As 
opposed to the numerical parameters reflected in the 2004 Codes, the new Statement seems 
to be predicated on principled restrictions.  This is commendable in that it accommodates a 
greater degree of flexibility in light of the peculiarities of each sector. However the danger of 
such principled demarcations is first, that they may be open to abuse and inconsistencies 
given the discretion required in making such determinations, and also that they may 
potentially defeat the quantitative unification function that the Generic Codes fulfil.  
 
It is submitted that the moderation function played by the ‘independent party’ and the 
ultimate approval of the Sector Codes by the Minster may avert this danger. Nevertheless, the 
middle-ground between standardisation and flexibility is a delicate balance to achieve, and it 
is submitted that although principles should root formulation, statistics must not branch too 
far apart, as a level of standardisation is indispensable in comparing progress across sectors 
and measuring BEE progress as a whole. The last complaint is that the qualifications for an 
independent third party to be appointed as such by the Minister are not spelt out which is an 
unfortunate omission.   
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This paper projects that in light of the role that Sector Codes are to play, Sector 
Transformation Charters are, in and of themselves, likely to become redundant. This is 
because the onerous procedure to establish a Transformation Charter in terms of s 12 of the 
Act317 is incommensurate with the aim of simply illustrating a commitment to BEE.318 The 
time and resources employed for the mere formal declaration of devotion would be better 
utilised in the construction of Sector Codes. In addition, ‘Enterprise Charters and Black 
Economic Empowerment Plans’319provide a simpler and more economical alternative to 
achieve the same purpose. It must be remembered however, that Sector Transformation 
Charters may still prove useful when their instrumental role is considered in the development 
of Sector Codes. 
 
6.1.2 Conclusion on the Internal Challenges  
In conclusion, the steps taken by the DTI to simplify and restructure the Codes are 
praiseworthy. The evolution of the regulatory instruments is an incremental process and has 
come a long way in providing certainty and clarity on a myriad of issues. However the 
elusive balance that would make them user-friendly and yet informative enough to facilitate 
implementation, as well as standardised and yet peculiar enough, is yet to be achieved. 
Ultimately, practice will reveal the pragmatic challenges and solutions. 
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6.2 CHALLENGES OUTSIDE OF THE REGULATORY  
      FRAMEWORK  
 
6.2.1 Financing BEE 
6.2.1.1 Source of Funds 
 The financing of BEE is a particularly thorny issue320 mainly because beneficiaries of 
BEE usually have insufficient savings or obtain credit at extremely high interest on account 
of being viewed as high risk clients by any potential financiers.321 BEE entrepreneurs are 
therefore severely restricted in accessing business opportunities.322 A further contributing 
factor is that debt instruments are usually used to purchase equity and as a result profits made 
by black companies are channelled toward servicing these debts.323  
 
To compound the situation, the Act324 does not outline exactly how BEE is to be 
financed. The only mention of financing is in s 11 (2) (b) where, in terms of the strategy 
issued by the Minister in terms of s 11 (1) (a), the Minister is obliged to ‘develop a plan for 
financing broad-based black economic empowerment’.325 The question arises whether the 
state is obliged to provide financing for BEE and if so, to what extent?326 It has been 
submitted that the obligation imposed by s 11 (2) (b) imposes on the State a duty to devise a 
workable plan envisaged by the section, and not necessarily a duty to finance BEE directly 
from state funds.327 Through this plan, the state can formulate a mechanism whereby 
participants of the private sector or international funding houses can finance BEE.328  Failing 
the mobilisation of non-state funds, it has been submitted that the government would then be 
obliged to deploy state resources.329 
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 The Strategy Document330 and state practice reveal that the government has 
proceeded on the understanding that it is legally obliged to source funds from both the public 
and private sector.331 With the DTI as co-coordinator, some mechanisms have been set up to 
ensure financing of BEE for example, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC),332 
Khula Enterprise Finance,333 the National Empowerment Fund (NEF),334 the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA),335 the Public Investment Commissioners (PIC),336 Ntsika 
Enterprise Promotion Agency, the Isibaya and Umsombomvu funds.337 
                                                 
330
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It is submitted that the high-liquidity of financial institutions renders the financial 
sector an ideal BEE financier.338 Contributions by the sector would not only facilitate BEE, 
but would make good business sense in light of the points that entities could earn for the 
‘enterprise development’ element of the Scorecard. To date, the finance sector has shown 
some initiative in this regard as illustrated in Table 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: BEE FACILLITATION VEHICLES339 
INSTITUTION PURPOSE OF FUND BEE FACILLITATION VEHICLES  
 
Sanlam 
 
Development Fund 
 
The Development Fund makes it 
possible for institutional investors and 
retirement funds to contribute towards 
growth and reconstruction, and the 
more equitable distribution of 
economic benefits, whilst earning 
yield concomitant to the development 
risk of the investment.  
 
 
• Large infrastructure projects, through 
public/private partnerships. 
• Urban infrastructure projects, through 
structured finance deals. 
• Small and medium business and housing 
projects, through investing in retail 
intermediaries. 
• Unlisted financing vehicles supporting 
economic empowerment of previously 
disadvantaged groups. 
• Private equity funds with development 
focus.  
 
 
Metropolitan Life 
 
Futurebuilder 
Funds 
 
Futurebuilder offers the investor an 
opportunity to contribute to the 
development of the country and to 
support projects, which contribute 
towards improved economic growth 
and social stability. Futurebuilder aims 
to obtain consistently high real returns 
for its clients.  
 
• Trident Institute-Basic business skills 
development, through provision of seed 
capital and financial support. 
• Small business development, through 
provision of start up loans. 
• Private unlisted financing vehicles 
supporting economic empowerment of 
previously disadvantaged individuals or 
groups.  
• Infrastructure development, through 
private sector investments.  
 
 
 
                                                 
338
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339
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 The Brenthurst Initiative (The Initiative)340 has suggested additional sources of 
funding that include nurturing basic black-owned equity though tax friendly Employee Share 
Option Programmes (ESOPs) or requiring mandatory levels of savings.341 The Initiative also 
suggests devising incentives to encourage not only individuals to invest in BEE companies, 
but also companies to provide ‘special purpose financing instruments’.342  
  
6.2.1.2 Section 38 of the Companies Act 
It has been argued that vendor financing is a particularly viable financing option.343 
The problem with this suggestion is that it stands in potential contravention of the Companies 
Act.344 Section 38 provides that 
 
No company shall give, whether directly or indirectly by means of a loan, guarantee, the provision of 
security or otherwise, any financial assistance for the purpose or in connection with a purchase or 
subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any shares of the company, or where the 
company is a subsidiary, of its holding company.345  
 
When companies enter into a BEE transaction aimed at transferring ownership and 
control to a BEE enterprise through the acquisition of shares by the BEE company, in many 
instances these companies will look to facilitate the purchase of its shares.346 The problem is 
that s 38 precludes the company from financing the BEE enterprise’s share purchase, which 
in most circumstances would be the most viable financing option.347 The consequences of 
non-compliance with s 38 are that the transaction will be deemed void and the directors and 
the company will be guilty of an offence.348 Furthermore, such a contravention cannot be 
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cured by shareholder, creditor or court approval.349  It is clear that s 38 poses an almost 
insurmountable challenge to the financing of BEE.  
 
 A possible way to avoid contravening the section is through the use of Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) - the BEE company acquires shares through a SPV, and an external 
financier provides the SPV with the necessary funds for the purchase of the shares.350 The 
BEE partner will then be required by the financier to furnish as security for the SPV’s 
obligations, its shareholding in the SPV,351 thus increasing the risks and costs of the 
transaction for the BEE company.352 Furthermore, these deals are highly leveraged with 
success depending largely on market performance of share prices,353 which results in 
unsustainable transactions.354  
 
 An alternative to SPV’s is the use of ‘deferred shares’.355 This would be in line with 
the rationale underlying the Malaysian strategy of issuing no-par value shares,356 which is 
essentially to bring increased equity within the range of beneficiary groups at a lower cost 
than ordinary shares, thus rendering them cheaper and more accessible.357 Furthermore, the 
issue of deferred shares would tend to increase investor confidence.358 The disadvantage with 
deferred shares however is that benefits derived from them are deferred benefits.359 
Nevertheless the issue of deferred shares may prove valuable if they mature into something 
more, which may happen if BEE companies prove themselves as productive entities. This in 
turn would have a knock-on benefit of increased value addition to the economy. 
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 Recently Companies have moved to engineering innovative and complex financing 
structures to overcome the s 38 obstacle. An example of such an elaborate structure is the 
2006 Standard Bank deal which has been hailed as one of the largest BEE deals to date.360 
The Standard Bank deal comprised two stages.361 First, Standard Bank issued ordinary shares 
to its wholly owned subsidiary and financed the purchase of these shares by this SPV through 
a subscription of preference shares in the SPV. The second stage of the transaction involved 
the sale of the Standard Bank ordinary shares held by the SPV to a number of BEE investors 
at a nominal value.362 This nominal price brought the shares within affordable range and 
meant that the BEE entities were able to self-fund this purchase without relying on vendor 
finance, which stands to contravene s 38. The argument is that this transaction does not 
amount to a breach of s 38 because of its two tiered nature- the first part falling into the s 38 
(2) (d) exemption,363 and there having been no financial assistance to any party in the second 
part. 
 
It is submitted that the transaction should be viewed as the sum of its parts. When so 
viewed, the transaction does in fact amount to a contravention of s 38 as Standard Bank has 
in fact provided financial assistance for the subscription of its own shares, notwithstanding 
the use of the SPV as a conduit. Despite this generally accepted view on the ‘illegality’ of the 
Standard Bank deal, there has been a tendency to turn a blind eye to such s 38 breaches in 
light of the hindrance it poses to BEE progress. In the final instance, as creative as such 
structures are, they are extremely complex, expensive to implement,364 and considerable tax 
implications are usually associated with such arrangements.365   
 
 Whichever way it is viewed, s 38 is highly problematic and needs to be amended with 
a view to achieving a balance between the ‘share buy-back provisions and associated capital 
adequacy rules in terms of the Companies Act’ and ‘the need to facilitate BEE’.366 It has 
been suggested that the general prohibition on financial assistance be maintained with the 
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amendment taking the form of an additional exemption that deals with empowerment 
transactions and details capital maintenance requirements in the form of provisos.367 The 
Corporate Laws Amendment Bill, to be enacted in early 2007, adopts a more commendable 
alternative providing that companies are not prohibited from ‘giving financial assistance for 
the purchase of or subscription of shares of that company or its holding company’368 
provided the solvency and liquidity requirements are met.369 It is submitted that the ‘solvency 
and liquidity’ test is preferable as it is less cumbersome and more flexible than the 
‘exemption and proviso’ construction. 
 
6.2.1.3 Sustainability of BEE Transactions  
 A major problem that arises in the field of financing is the effect of funding structures 
on the sustainability of BEE transactions. The reliance on erratic share prices as a gauge of 
performance often presents a distorted picture of BEE progress,370 and hinders BEE 
companies from undertaking strategic long-term planning thus increasing the risk of 
economic failure.371 A further problem is that the indebtedness of BEE entities means that 
economic benefits tend to lie in the hands of the financier, as opposed to adding economic 
value to the BEE partners.372  
 
It is suggested that deals be structured with sustainability as the primary focus. Where 
debt finance is used, a key ingredient for success is the funding of empowerment transactions 
by use of long term debt (5 to 12 year time horizon) as opposed to short repayment periods of 
between 3 to 5 years.373 This would give the BEE partner a chance to establish itself, instead 
of being shackled by onerous debt repayment obligations in the early years of operation. The 
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Afrikaner model, devised by Sanlam, is a viable empowerment structure, as the pooling of 
personal savings through intermediaries results in long-term asset growth.374 Ultimately 
economic growth is the key driver in ensuring sustainability, and government therefore needs 
to adopt measures that encourage such growth.375 
 
6.2.1.4 Conclusion on financing  
 As is apparent from the above, the financing of BEE poses many significant 
challenges to the BEE enterprise, however, as illustrated by the recommendations proffered 
above, these challenges are not insurmountable. The same is true for many aspects of BEE as 
will become evident in the discussion to follow that deals with the broadness of broad-based 
BEE.  
 
6.2.2 Broad-Based BEE: The Breadth of the Matter 
 6.2.2.1 Defining the Ambit of BEE 
A crucial issue is how far the arms of empowerment are to reach. BEE, viewed from a 
benevolent perspective, can be regarded as a move to ensure transformation that will improve 
‘the lives of all South Africans’.376 A contrary perspective would be to regard BEE as an 
initiative directed towards the creation of a critical mass of Black middle class. 377 The latter 
approach appears to be more realistically attainable, where a focus on expanding ownership 
through equity transfer and increasing levels of management control378 is easier to facilitate, 
as is reflected by the tendency of SA businesses to empower via these channels.379  
Furthermore, this narrow approach to empowerment is a trend reflected in the long-standing 
and relatively successful economic empowerment approach adopted in Malaysia.380  
 
It is clear from the Generic Scorecard however, that BEE is intended to extend further 
than equity ownership and management, and is to include employment equity, skills 
development, preferential procurement, enterprise development and corporate social 
development. Out of a possible 100 points that can be scored, 70 of those points are directed 
towards a broad-base of Black people, including employees, workers with minimal or no 
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skills, entrepreneurs, Small to Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMME’s) and rural 
communities.381  BEE is clearly intended to be an all-inclusive enterprise serving to empower 
a broad spectrum of the black population, however, several factors thwart this vision.  This 
paper will canvass two of the most glaring of these factors, namely ‘elite bias’ and skills 
development.  
 
6.2.2.2. ‘Elite Bias’  
The first wave of BEE, as identified by the South African Advertising Research 
Foundation (SAARF),382 seems to have afforded benefits to only a few people, particularly 
businessmen within the ANC,383 creating a ‘new Black bourgeoisie’.384 This elite bias is not 
unique to SA however, as preferences in Malaysia stood primarily to benefit coalition 
members, their relatives and those who were already privileged.385 Similarly, preferential 
policies in the US have largely benefited the already wealthy members of the minority 
grouping,386 with little empowerment reaching lower levels of intended beneficiaries.387 It 
has been suggested that a solution to the SA dilemma would be the imposition of BEE 
transaction restrictions which would limit the total number of BEE transactions that any 
individual beneficiary can conclude.388  
 
The second wave of BEE has seen the rise of young upcoming black professionals 
termed ‘buppies’, with the third wave characterized by ‘bappies’- ‘booming, aspirational and 
previously poor’ entrepreneurs.389 It is hoped that the fourth wave will be characterized by 
increased skills deployment and rural community upliftment, however, these factors are 
prone to incremental implementation.390 It is submitted that companies use their initiative to 
design means that will expedite the achievement of the broad-based goal, and a feasible 
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starting point would be to focus on the critical issue of skills development, which is 
essential for sustainable economic empowerment.   
 
6.2.2.3 Skills Development  
There is a dire need to develop broad-based skills in SA.391 Inadequate skill transfer 
results in the consequent inability of Black managers and entrepreneurs to manage capital 
assets thus extending undue reliance on previously advantaged partners.392 Furthermore, 
inadequate human resource development may disadvantage South Africa’s competitive 
standing in the global markets.393 Skills transfer is thus crucial to ensuring effective 
empowerment.  
 
C400S400 governs skill development,394 and enterprises can earn up to 20 points 
depending on, inter alia, the level of ‘skills development spend’ on ‘critical and/or core skills 
for black employees’ and on learnerships administered by Sector Education Training 
Authorities (SETAs).395 This Code is buttressed by, and is compatible with, the Skills 
Development Act (SDA)396 and their combination provides an excellent framework for skill 
deployment. The problem rests in the implementation, where apathy together with resource 
shortages hamper action. A proposed practical solution for facilitating skill empowerment is 
for each sector to focus on developing skills within their respective sectors. Such a move is 
apparent in the ICT sector, where the Black Information Technology Forum (BITF)397 has 
assumed a lead role in skills deployment,398 which is proving to be successful.399 Sector 
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oriented skills development400 has the advantage of being able to pool resources towards 
focusing on skills specifically required in the respective sectors. It is submitted that the 
Codes should be the instrument mandating this initiative, and that by failing to mention this, 
or other such collaborative resource mobilisation schemes, the Codes fall short. 
 
6.2.2.4 Conclusion on Broad-based BEE 
As noted, the fact that empowerment is to be broad-based is undisputed however, the 
lived realities reflect a divergence from this goal. The primary responsibility rests on the 
shoulders of the Minister of Trade and Industry and the BEE Advisory Council to pursue 
‘outcomes-based implementation’ of both the Act and the Codes, in order to ensure that 
broad-based BEE becomes a reality in South Africa.401 Private entities too have a part to play 
though, as by broadening their perspective on the empowerment aim, considering not only 
return on investment but also the broader BEE ideology, they assist in making broad-based 
BEE tangible. A factor that serves as a barrier to not only the broad-based pursuit, but also to 
the BEE initiative in general, is the prevalent occurrence of fronting which limits the  
prospects of sustainable402 empowerment. The next part of this paper will elaborate further.  
 
6.2.3 Fraudulence: The Fronting Barrier  
Fronting is in essence ‘tokenism [or the] superficial inclusion of historically 
disadvantaged individuals’,403 with no actual transfer of wealth or control.404 It is a cynical 
manipulation of regulatory requirements that amounts to defrauding the government, and 
defeats the aims of BEE.405 Fronting is most commonly understood as ‘window dressing’ 
which involves either promoting inexperienced and unskilled Black people to senior 
managerial positions, or employing Black people without providing them with any work to 
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do.406All this is done with a view to appearing to be BEE compliant. More insidious 
fronting forms include, but are not limited to, what are termed ‘fronts on paper’,407 ‘fictitious 
companies’,408 ‘fronts in joint ventures’409 and lastly ‘front companies’.410 This paper will be 
limited to a discussion of ‘Front Companies’ as this is particularly prevalent in both Malaysia 
and the US, the comparative schemes addressed above.  
 
Front companies misrepresent their status as empowerment companies in an 
endeavour to gain preferential benefits411 and thus disadvantage authentic entities.412 In 
Malaysia these are termed ‘Ali Baba’ enterprises where Malays (Ali) are the face of what are 
in reality Chinese (Baba) owned companies.413  Similarly in SA, a frequent occurrence in the 
construction industry is for contracts awarded to BEE companies to be sub-contracted to 
white owned enterprises, where ‘all white minority shareholders in the BEE company are in 
fact majority shareholders in the white company’.414 The impact of fronting is apparent from 
the probe by the Department of Trade and Works in August 2005,415 which revealed an 
estimated loss of R 4441,1 million from fronting scams.416 In the US similar frauds were 
perpetrated by Tyco Manufacturing and ‘Automated Data Management’, which were both 
companies masquerading as minority entities to gain preferences.417  What this pattern 
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417
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reveals is that this form of fraud seems to be inextricable from empowerment programmes, 
and the question then turns to what preventative measures are available.  
 
C000S001418 is specifically geared toward combating fronting. Verification Agencies 
are to play a central role in this exercise and are responsible for identifying ‘Fronting Risk 
Indicators’,419 determining fronting scores,420 and reporting on their findings.421 Similarly, 
the US system relies on certification and accreditation audits as a preventative measure.422  
 
 Any entity that engages in fronting practices stands to be prosecuted as fronting 
amounts to fraud and as such it is a criminal offence.423 Should such a company be ‘found 
guilty of fraud or misrepresentation…[it ] and its directors may be black listed’ in terms of 
C000S001 para 10.5.424 A further misfortune that will befall such miscreant companies is that 
any contracts entered into are voidable.425   
 
6.2.3.1Conclusion on Fronting 
 The fronting barrier needs to be broken through if BEE is to have any hope of 
success. This cynical manipulation of the regulatory framework results from a microscopic 
attitude towards BEE. Attitude is a crucial aspect in determining the direction that BEE will 
take, and this paper will now turn to consider certain attitudes that may misdirect the 
enterprise.  
 
                                                 
418
 C000S001 of 2005: Department of  Trade and Industry (Phase Two 2005 Codes) Code 000 ‘Framework for 
the Measurement of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment : Statement 001 ‘Fronting Practices and 
Other Misrepresentation of BEE Status at www.dti.gov.za (Accessed on 29/01/07)5 
419
 ‘Indicators of Fronting risk may be either high-risk or moderate risk in nature’. (C000S001 of 2005 (n 418) 
para 7).  
For an enumeration of these indicators, see C000S001 of 2005 (n 418) para 7.2 & para 7.3  
420
 See C000S001 of 2005 (n 418) para 10. ‘The fronting risk indicators will allow Verification Agencies…to 
classify Enterprises according to four different levels of Fronting Status…namely :10.4.1 Fraud; 10.4.2 
Excessive Fronting risk; 10.4.3 High Fronting risk; 10.4.4 Low Fronting Risk’.  
421
 See C000S001 of 2005 (n 418) paras 7; 8 ; 9 & 10.  
422
 Lewis (n 59). 
423
 Daly ‘A Recipe for Woe’ in Black Economic Empowerment (May 2003) Business Day Survey at 8 and 
Moloi (n 410)32. 
424
  C000S001 of 2005 (n 418) at para 10.5.  
425
 Daly (n 423) 8 and Moloi (n 410) 33.  
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6.2.4. Attitudinal Constraints: ‘A Culture of Entitlement’ and ‘A Culture  
          of Resentment’   
 
Certain attitudes hinder true transformation and may even go so far as to nurture a 
hostile environment. One such attitude is the growing ‘culture of entitlement’426 amongst 
previously disadvantaged groups, which is also a mindset evident in the Malay population.427 
Groups feel that because benefits are assured they are not compelled to perform.428 This in 
turn may generate a ‘culture of resentment’ amongst previously advantaged groups who 
leave the country (resulting in ‘brain drain’),429 resist the philosophy, or simply become 
disillusioned.430 In the US, frustration is evidenced by the numerous preferential schemes that 
have been constitutionally challenged,431 and more dramatically, by spates of violence as a 
result of ‘public racial intolerance’.432    
 
In terms of redress, the Malaysian government dealt with public intolerance by 
instituting several laws aimed at limiting free speech,433 however, this solution is untenable 
in a democratic South Africa. The recommended manner to counter these attitudinal 
constraints is to nurture a ‘culture of mutual understanding’. This can be facilitated through 
open dialogues and other such forums. Furthermore, educating the nation on the real need for 
BEE, the co-operation required for its success, and the knock on benefits for the economy, 
will assist in broadening myopic vision. Although not an ideal method, a constant reminder 
that BEE is not intended to be an indefinite enterprise434 could possibly jolt those who feel 
entitled into real action, while contemporaneously providing those who feel disadvantaged 
with a sense of eventual respite.   
                                                 
426
 Kennedy (n 244) 32.  
427
 ‘The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahatir bin Mahomed, one of the advocates and architects of the country’s 
affirmative action policies, said in August 2002:…[receiving preferences] is considered a matter of right and is 
not valued anymore…they don’t seem to appreciate the opportunities that they get…they learn nothing about 
business and become even less capable of doing business and earning an income from their activities…I feel 
disappointed because I achieved too little in my principal task of making my race a successful race, a race that 
is respected.’ Sowell (n 33) 74-75.  
428
 Sowell (n 33) 74.  
429
 Janisch ‘Returning Expats and the Future of South Africa’ (15 January 2007) at 
http://www.entrepreneur.co.za/BEE/home.aspx (Accessed on 29/01/07).  
430
 Sowell (n 33) 14 & 187 and Safi (n 381) 48. 
431
 Sweet (n 71) 162-164.  
432
 Encarta (n 56). Also see Nesiah (n 387) 33.  
433
  Galenson Labour and Economic Growth in Five Asian Countries: South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and the Philippines 18. See also Sowell (n 33) 60 and 76.   
434
 Balshaw (n 123) 86 also see C000S000 of 2005 (n 112) para 11. In terms of this paragraph, the Codes are set 
to run for a period of 10 years, and will be reviewed at the end of this period with the chance that they may be 
renewed.   
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6.3 CONCLUSION ON THE CHALLENGES 
 This subsection of the paper has illustrated the general kinds of challenges that face 
BEE. It is clear that BEE still has a long way to go in ironing out these problems that stand to 
thwart the entire initiative.   
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7. CONCLUSION: THE FINAL WORD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this paper has been to assess the BEE regulatory framework and to 
critically discuss the challenges facing the BEE drive. This undertaking involved an 
introduction of the BEE philosophy couched within both a historical and international 
context. The paper then highlighted the comprehensive and yet complex regulatory 
framework governing BEE, and the crux of the paper elucidated the current challenges 
hindering BEE implementation. It is the conclusion of this paper that BEE, as a work in 
progress, has made marginal strides and has the potential to ensure that a broad base of 
intended beneficiaries are empowered. However, should the challenges outlined in this paper 
not be overcome, the empowerment goal may be elusive. As this paper illustrates, these 
hurdles are not insurmountable and with dedication and ingenuity, BEE has the potential to 
be one of the most successful empowerment strategies the world over.  
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8. APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
8.1    APPENDIX 1: THE BEE CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE  
 
THE PHASE ONE 2005 CODES  
 
CODE/Statement Descriptions Release 
Date 
CODE 000 Framework for the measurement of Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment 
1 November 05 
Statement 000 The Organisation of the Codes of Good Practice, the elements 
of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Generic 
Scorecard 
1 November 05 
Statement 010 Guidelines for the Development and Gazetting of 
Transformation Charters 
1 November 05 
Statement 020 The Approval, Accreditation and Regulation of BEE Verification 
Agencies 
1 November 05 
CODE 100 Measurement of the Ownership Element of Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment 
1 November 05 
Statement 100 The General Ownership Scorecard and the Recognition of 
Ownership Arising from the Sale of Equity Instruments 
1 November 05 
Statement 101 The Recognition Of Ownership Contributions Arising From Sales 
Of Businesses/Assets In Qualifying Transactions 
1 November 05 
CODE 200 Measurement of the Management and Control Element of 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment  
1 November 05 
Statement 200 The General Recognition of Management Control 1 November 05 
 
Sourced from DTI website at  http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/2CODESOFGOODPRACTICE2005.htm (Accessed 
on 12 February 2007.  
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THE PHASE TWO 2005 CODES  
 
CODE/Statement Descriptions Release Date 
CODE 000 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework 20 December 05 
Statement 001 Fronting practices and other misrepresentation of BEE status 20 December 05 
Statement 002 Specific verifications issues relating to complex Structures 20 December 05 
CODE 100 Measurement of the Ownership element of B-BBEE 20 December 05 
Statement 102 The Recognition of Ownership Contributions arising from 
Investments by BEE Targeted Warehousing Funds 
20 December 05 
Statement 103 The Recognition of Ownership Contributions by Multinational 
Companies 
20 December 05 
Statement 104 The Recognition of Ownership Contributions made by Public 
Entities and Organs of the State 
20 December 05 
Statement 105 The Recognition of Ownership Contributions made by 
Companies limited by Guarantee and Section 21 Companies 
20 December 05 
CODE 300 Measurement of the Employment Equity Element of Broad- 
Based Black Economic Empowerment 
20 December 05 
Statement 300 The Recognition of Employment Equity Contributions 20 December 05 
CODE 400 Measurement of the Skills Development Element of Broad- 
Based Black Economic Empowerment 
20 December 05 
Statement 400 The Recognition of Skills Development and Organisational 
Transformation Contributions to Black Economic Empowerment 
20 December 05 
CODE 500 Measurement of the Preferential Procurement Element of 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment  
20 December 05 
Statement 500 The Recognition of Preferential Procurement Contributions 20 December 05 
CODE 600 Measurement of the Enterprise Development Element of 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
20 December 05 
Statement 600 The Recognition of Enterprise Development Contributions 20 December 05 
CODE 700 Measurement of the Residual Element of Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment 
20 December 05 
Statement 700 The Recognition of Residual Contributions 20 December 05 
 
Sourced from DTI website at http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/2NDPHASE.htm (Accessed on 12 February 2007)  
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8.2    APPENDIX 2:  CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE ON BROAD-BASED 
                                     BEE FOR QUALIFIYING SMALL ENTERPRISES  
 
CODE/Statement Descriptions Release Date 
CODE 1000 Framework for the Measurement of Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment amongst Qualifying Small 
Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1000 The Organisation of the Codes of Good Practice pertaining 
to Qualifying Small Enterprises, The Elements of Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Qualifying 
Small Enterprise Scorecard 
20 December 05 
CODE 1100 Measurement of the Ownership Element for Qualifying 
Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1100 The General Ownership Scorecard and the Recognition of 
Ownership arising from the Sale of Equity Instruments for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
CODE 1200 Measurement of the Management Control Element for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1200 The General Recognition of Management Control for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
CODE 1300 Measurement of the Employment Equity Element for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1300 The Recognition of Employment Equity Contributions for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
CODE 1400 Measurement of the Skills Development Element for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1400 The Recognition of Skills Development and Organisational 
Transformation Contributions for Qualifying Small 
Enterprises 
20 December 05 
CODE 1500 Measurement of the Preferential Procurement Element for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1500 The Recognition of Preferential Procurement Contributions 
for Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
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CODE 1600 Measurement of the Enterprise Development Element for 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1600 The Recognition of Enterprise Development Contributions 
for Qualifying Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
CODE 1700 Measurement of the Residual Element for Qualifying Small 
Enterprises 
20 December 05 
Statement 1700 The Recognition of Residual Contributions for Qualifying 
Small Enterprises 
20 December 05 
 
 
Sourced from DTI website at http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/2NDPHASE.htm (Accessed on 12 February 2007)  
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8.3 APPENDIX 3: THE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION CHARTERS IN 
                                 PERSPECTIVE 
 
 MINING SECTOR  FINANCIAL SECTOR ICT SECTOR (Final Draft 
Version 2005) 
Characteristics The mining industry is 
the longest standing 
industry in South 
Africa, and has in the 
past been funded by 
White capital and 
characterized by a 
Black majority of 
cheap labour. 
The financial sector is central 
to the South African 
economy, and is a key 
financier in the BEE 
initiative. This sector has 
been characterized by a lack 
of Black equity holding, 
Black management and 
Black control.  
The ICT sector is a fairly 
new sector in the South 
Africa economy and is a 
dynamic and fast-paced 
sector. Constraints limiting 
Black participation in the 
ICT sector are inadequate 
business skills, and 
difficulties in accessing 
capital on account of limited 
credit facilities available to 
Black businesses. 
Vision of the Charter To create a globally 
competitive mining 
industry that draws on 
the human and 
financial resources of 
all South Africans and 
[that] offer[s] real 
benefits to all South 
Africans [in an 
endeavour to reach the 
charter goal of a] non-
racial South Africa, 
through equity transfer 
and skills 
development. 
To actively promote a 
transformed, vibrant, and 
globally competitive 
financial sector that reflects 
the demographics of South 
Africa, and contributes to the 
establishment of an equitable 
society’ through the pursuit 
of sustainable growth 
combined with skills and 
asset base development. 
To promote effective 
implementation of the 
BBBEE Act in the ICT 
sector, as well Bridge the 
“digital divide” by actively 
promoting access to ICT’s . 
Further to contribute 
towards the reduction of 
unemployment and poverty 
alleviation as well as to 
support skills development, 
training initiatives and the 
fostering of equity. 
 
Intended Beneficiaries  Historically 
Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA) 
refers to any person, 
category of persons or 
community, 
disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination 
before the 
Constitution of the 
Republic of South 
Africa, 1993 (Act No. 
200 of 1993) came 
into operation.  
All black people, including 
women, workers, youth, 
people with 
disabilities and people living 
in rural areas 
Black people means all 
Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians who are South 
African citizens and includes 
black companies. 
However, in paragraphs 5 
and 11 the term shall include 
permanent residents of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
The word “black” when used 
in conjunction with other 
words shall have the same 
implications. 
 
 
 
 
All black people, including 
black women, workers, 
youth, people with 
disabilities and people 
living in rural areas 
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Equity Target 
(Ownership and 
Control) 
26% by 2012. 
Considers active and 
passive involvement. 
Ownership: 25% Black 
ownership at holding 
company level is set for 
2010; 10% direct ownership. 
Management/Control:  
Black directors 33% of Black 
directors on its board by 
2008. 
Black women directors 11% 
by 2008. 
Black Executives 4% by 
2008. 
 
Ownership: 30% equity 
subject to a range of 
conditions. 
Management/Control: 
60% black people in the 
governing body with black 
women comprising 50% of 
the former. 
 
Employment Equity  40% HDSA 
(Historically 
Disadvantaged South 
Africans) by 2007 
10% women by 2007 
Black top management 20-
25% by 2008 
Black women top 
management 4% by 2008 
Black middle management 
30% by 2008 
Black junior management 
40-50% by 2008 
Women junior management 
15% by 2008 
50% black people in senior 
management positions 
with 30% black women as a 
% of the former.  
65% of black people in 
other management positions 
with black women being 
30% of the former. 
 
 
Procurement  From HDSA over 3-5 
years 
50% by 2008 
70% by 2014 
Further targets per company 
categories 
70% of eligible 
procurement from excellent, 
good and 
satisfactory BEE 
contributors (A minimum of 
30% of the 70% 
procurement spend should 
be directed 
towards black owned, black 
empowered and black 
engendered SMME”s that 
are excellent and good 
contributors to BEE) 
 
 
Enterprise 
Development  
Not addressed Develop new and foster 
existing BEE companies 
(specifics provided)) 
Make quantifiable support 
equal 
to 5% of eligible 
procurement spend; in black 
owned, black empowered 
and 
black engendered SMME’s 
that are excellent and good 
contributors to BE 
 
Skills Development  Functionally & 
numerate literate by 
2005 
Career paths and 
Mentoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 % (as % of payroll 
spend) 
2% (as % of payroll spend) 
Provision of  learnerships 
equivalent to 5% of 
employees. 
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Residual/Other  -Licensing 
-Mine community and 
rural development  
-Housing & living 
conditions (hostels) 
-Nutrition 
-Migrant labour 
-Beneficiation 
State assets  
-Access to financial services 
-Corporate social 
investment/involvement: 
0.5% (of operating profit 
after tax) by 2014 
-HR development  
-Provision of ICT’s in 
education, district health 
systems and those set out in 
licence conditions 
-General corporate social 
investment that enhances 
the lives of black people. 
 
Financing  R100 billion by 2007 
for HDSA 
R 75 billion for HDSA 
participation 
The ICT Charter Council to 
make proposals for the 
establishment of a special 
BEE fund to finance the 
acquisition of equity from 
established companies in 
the ICT industry. 
Scorecard None Financial Sector Scorecard. ICT sector Scorecard. 
 
The information in this table reflects the status at time of writing.  
 
Information sourced from: http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/beecharters.htm (Accessed on 2 December  2006).  
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8.4   APPENDIX 4: BEE DEALS CONCLUDED IN THE FINANCIAL  
                                  SERVICES, MINING AND ICT SECTORS  
 
MINING SECTOR BEE DEALS 
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FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR BEE DEALS  
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ICT SECTOR BEE DEALS  
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Tables Sourced from Shubane, K & Reddy, C ‘Behind The Deals’ (2005) BusinessMap Foundation:Economic 
Transformation and Empowerment at 17-19 & 28. 
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8.5    APPENDIX 5: BLACK CONTROL ON THE JSE  
 
 
 
   
  Table extracted from Reddy, C ‘Empowerment on the JSE’  
(2004) BusinessMap 55 at 56.  
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8.6    APPENDIX 6: THE BEE SCORECARDS: A COMPARISON  
THE 2004 COMPREHENSIVE SCORECARD435  
 
 
                                                 
435
 C000S000 of 2004 (n 158) para 57.  
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THE 2005 SIMPLIFIED SCORECARD436  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
436
 C000S000 (n 12) para 8.  
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